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Abstract
We analyse if the adoption of a fiscal spending rule insulates the domestic econ-
omy from commodity price fluctuations in a resource-rich economy. To do so we
develop a time-varying Dynamic Factor Model, in which we allow both the volatility
of structural shocks and the systematic fiscal policy responses to change over time.
We focus on Norway, a country that is put forward as exemplary with its handling
of resource wealth. Unlike most oil exporters, Norway has devised a fiscal frame-
work with the view to shield the domestic economy from oil price fluctuations. By
transferring its petroleum revenues to a sovereign wealth fund, and then consuming
only the expected real return on the fund, fiscal policy allows for a gradual phasing
in of the petroleum revenue, unrelated to movements in oil prices. We find that,
contrary to common perception, fiscal policy has been more (not less) procyclical
with commodity prices since the adoption of the fiscal rule in 2001. Fiscal policy
has thereby worked to exacerbate the commodity price fluctuations on the domestic
economy. Large inflows of money to the fund during a period of rapidly increasing
oil prices is part of the explanation. Still, Norway has managed to save a large
share of its petroleum income for future generations. Compared to many other
resource-rich economies practising a more spend-as-you-go strategy, this is a great
success.
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1 Introduction
In countries where the resource revenue constitutes a large component of total govern-
ment revenue, commodity price fluctuations will have a direct impact on public spending.
Many resource-rich countries are therefore advised to adopt some type of fiscal policy
framework (i.e., a fiscal spending rule), which, if operated countercyclically, may shelter
the economy from commodity price fluctuations and prevent over-spending on the part
of the government caused by the resource endowment. The adoption of a fiscal rule, how-
ever, does not in itself prove that fiscal policy works to insulate the domestic economy
from commodity price fluctuations. To ascertain whether this is so, we need to determine
the response of fiscal policy to changes in conditions impinging on commodity prices.
This is the aim of the present paper. As a first study, we analyze fiscal policy’s response
to different commodity market shocks over time and the extent to which this response
has insulated the domestic economy from commodity price fluctuations or, conversely,
exacerbated their effect. To address this question we develop a time-varying Dynamic
Factor Model, in which we allow the volatility of structural shocks, the systematic fiscal
policy responses, and the macroeconomic conditions, to change over time. We focus on
Norway, a country whose handling of its resource wealth has been described as exemplary
(see e.g. OECD (2005), OECD (2007) and Velculescu (2008) among many others). Unlike
most oil exporters, Norway has adopted a fiscal framework in 2001, with a view to shielding
the budget, and hence indirectly also the domestic economy, from oil price fluctuations.
Thus, in comparing how fiscal policy responds to oil market shocks before and after the
rule’s implementation, our study provides us with a natural experiment for assessing fiscal
discipline over commodity price cycles.
Several papers have addressed the issue of fiscal procylicality by comparing fiscal pol-
icy responses to commodity price changes across resource-rich economies, see in particular
Pieschacon (2012) and Ce´spedes and Velasco (2014). Both present evidence of reduced
fiscal procyclicality to commodity price changes in countries that have improved institu-
tional quality, i.e., adopted fiscal policy rules. Using a counterfactual analysis, Pieschacon
(2012) compares Norway and Mexico in the period 1986-2006, and finds that had Norway
adopted a fiscal policy framework similar to Mexico’s, commodity price shocks would have
had a larger effect on the (Norwegian) economy. She therefore concludes that the fiscal
framework adopted by Norway did indeed shield the economy from oil price fluctuations.
Ce´spedes and Velasco (2014) draw their conclusion from comparing government expendi-
tures over two different commodity price cycles by a large panel of commodity exporting
countries. They find that in the earlier cycle (1970s), the fiscal balance deteriorates as
expenditures pick up. For the latter cycle (2000s), however, they find evidence of reduced
procyclicality in a number of countries, as fiscal expenditures falls relatively to GDP when
commodity prices increase. This, they argue, corresponds well with the adoption of fiscal
spending rules in many countries, such as Norway.
We question these results on the following grounds. First, both papers, and to our
knowledge, all other papers in this literature, assume the commodity price is exogenous
to the global economy, and proceed by investigating how a sudden unpredicted change
in commodity prices affects the domestic economy and public spending. The commodity
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price, however, is not exogenous. Recent studies have emphasized the role of global
demand as a driver of oil prices, see, e.g., Kilian (2009), Lippi and Nobili (2012) and
Aastveit et al. (2014). All find that the effect on the economy of an oil price increase
driven by an unanticipated global aggregate demand shock will differ considerably from
the effect of an oil price increase caused by, say, an unanticipated increase in precautionary
demand driven by fears about future oil supply shortfalls. Hence, as argued by Kilian
(2009), oil price shocks should not be considered alike when assessing the implications of
a change in the oil price on output. Nor, we will argue, should they be considered alike
when analysing the implications for fiscal policy in resource-rich economies.
To see this, consider the commodity price boom of the 1970s. A war and the subse-
quent OPEC embargo caused a sudden rise in the price of oil, hurting oil importers and the
global economy as such (see, e.g., Hamilton (1983)). To counteract any negative spillovers
to their domestic economy, many oil exporting countries increased the fiscal impulse in
line with the higher oil prices. In the recent (2000s) commodity price boom, however, the
oil prices rose primarily in response to higher global demand (see, e.g., Kilian (2009)),
giving a boost to the overall economy. In this case, fiscal policy may have remained coun-
tercyclical, not least in relation to the overall stimulus to GDP, which is what Ce´spedes
and Velasco (2014) and others measure. The reduced fiscal procyclicality reported in the
above mentioned studies may therefore have nothing to do with institutional quality or
adopted fiscal policy rules, but simply reflects that fiscal policy is responding to differ-
ent shocks at different times. And indeed, when we separate between various shocks to
the commodity market, we confirm that the countercyclical fiscal responses in the recent
boom is attributed to global activity shocks and their domestic propagation, rather than
the adopted fiscal framework.
Second, comparing fiscal policy responses across different commodity exporters im-
plicitly assumes they are in the same stages of development. This is seldom the case, as
countries may have extracted the windfall gain at different points in time. For instance,
Mexico was producing oil already by the turn of the twentieth century, and is today a
mature oil exporter, with oil and gas production accounting for 7-8 percent of GDP. Nor-
way, on the other hand, discovered its oil fields 70 years later and oil and gas production
accounts today for close to 25 percent of total GDP. In this sense, comparing the effects
of commodity price shocks on a mature and a new oil producer, as Pieschacon (2012) and
others do, is likely to suggest different responses that have nothing to do with he adoption
of fiscal rules per se, but simply reflect different stages of development.1 Moreover, apart
from being commodity exporters, Mexico and Norway in most other areas are highly dis-
similar. We argue that it is more informative to compare fiscal responses in one country
consistently over time than to compare fiscal responses across countries at a given time.
Doing so, we confirm that if Norway has a more muted response to oil price shocks than
countries like Mexico, it is for other reasons than the adoption of the fiscal rule.
Third, many countries are adopting fiscal rules in response to changing economic
conditions. In addition, the fiscal policy design is often particularly complex insofar as
1Using a related argument, Alexeev and Conrad (2009) control for initial endowment when comparing
growth performance in resource rich countries, and find natural resources to enhance long term growth,
which is quite the contrary to the findings of the traditional resource curse literature.
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countries combine the objectives of sustainability with the need for flexibility in response
to shocks, see Schaechter et al. (2012) for details. Norway is no exception. The current
fiscal framework states that the government’s non-oil structural deficit should equal the
long-run real return of the sovereign wealth fund, i.e., the Government Pension Fund -
Global (GPF), projected to be 4 percent.2 The GPF is a hybrid between a savings- and a
stabilization fund; As a savings fund, the main purpose is to build up reserves and save for
future generations. As a stabilization fund; the aim is to protect and stabilize the budget,
and hence the economy, from excess volatility in petroleum revenues. To ensure against
inherent procyclical behaviour, the fiscal guidelines allow temporary deviations from the
rule over the business cycle and in the event of extraordinary changes in the value of
the GPF. Therefore, when we compare the fiscal policy design prior to and following it’s
implementation, we need to control for time-varying changes in macroeconomic conditions
as much as in policy implementation.
The Dynamic Factor Model we develop permits us to address these shortcomings in the
existing literature in a consistent manner. We include time-varying factor loadings to allow
for changes in systematic policy responses across time, e.g., before and after the adoption
of the fiscal rule. We include stochastic volatility components to allow for changes in the
size of the structural shocks, e.g., the Great Moderation effect and the recent financial
crisis and Great Recession.3 By utilizing the factor model framework we are also able to
trace out the effect of different oil market shocks, i.e., global demand and oil price specific
(i.e., supply) shocks, on a number of public and non-public variables. Furthermore, we
can examine the responses over time and assess the relevance of government spending as
a propagation mechanism for shocks hitting the economy. In particular, we can analyze
whether fiscal policy has become more or less procyclical after the implementation of the
fiscal rule, and, to what extent fiscal policy has worked to exacerbate the commodity price
led business cycles over time.
The proposed time-varying Dynamic Factor Model is similar to the models developed
by, e.g., Lopes and Carvalho (2007), Del Negro and Otrok (2008), and Ellis et al. (2014).
We differ in the way we identify the dynamic factors, and in the way we model the
law of motion of the dynamic factors. In our contribution the dynamic factors are all
identified in terms of economic quantities. This allows us, in contrast to many earlier
factor model studies, to build on the structural VAR literature and identify the structural
shocks driving the dynamic factors.
Compared to existing evidence and common perceptions, our results are striking. First,
in the wake of oil price (specific) shocks, fiscal policy is procyclical on impact and over
response horizons. In particular, public spending, employment and wages in Norway all
increase in light of the higher oil prices, and, if anything, fiscal policy has been more (not
less) procyclical since the adoption of the fiscal policy rule in 2001. That is, given an
equally sized oil price shock, public spending and costs increase more today than they did
in the preceding decades. We also find a stronger pass-through of oil price shocks to the
2Since it’s establishment in the mid 1990s, the GPF has developed rapidly and is today the largest sovereign
wealth fund in the world.
3See, e.g., Cogley and Sargent (2005), Primiceri (2005), and Nakov and Pescatori (2010), and the references
therein, for a broader discussion of these effects and their possible causes.
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macro economy after the adoption of the fiscal rule, in particular during the last decade.
Hence, taking everything else as given and following an oil price shock, the adoption of
the spending rule has not meant that fiscal policy effectively insulated the economy from
an oil price shock. These findings stand in rather stark contrast to the arguments put
forward in, e.g., Pieschacon (2012).
Second, in the wake of a global activity shock, that also increases oil prices, the picture
becomes somewhat more nuanced, with some components of public spending alternating
from countercyclical to acyclical in the last decade, while others are more procyclical.
Thus, the main message is still that of a tendency for more (not less) fiscal procyclicality
since the adoption of the spending rule. This suggest that following a global downturn
where the domestic non-resource economy contracts, fiscal policy may have less room
to maneuver. At the same time, the domestic non-resource economy responds strongly
procyclically following the global activity shock. This shock also explains an increasing
share of the variation in the economy since the turn of the millennium. The strong
countercyclical fiscal policy responses (relative to GDP) in the last boom, as reported
by Ce´spedes and Velasco (2014), among others, are therefore most likely due to global
activity shocks and their domestic propagation, rather than a fiscal policy governed by a
rule.
In line with the arguments put forward by Kilian (2009), shocks leading to oil price
fluctuations should not, in light of our results, be considered alike when analysing the
effect on fiscal policy. Further, when analysing the effectiveness of fiscal policy rules it is
important, again in light of our results, to separate clearly between the time periods prior
to and after the implementation of different rules. To the best of our knowledge, neither
of these points has been addressed in the earlier literature on fiscal policy and resource
wealth. The proposed methodology employed in this paper and subsequent empirical
analysis addresses both issues.
Finally, we note, that although the fiscal framework has not managed to shelter the
Norwegian economy from oil price fluctuations, as a savings fund; many goals have been
achieved. In particular, by only using a small share of the windfall gain every year, the
Norwegian authorities have saved a large amount of money for future generations. Com-
pared to many other resource-rich economies practising a more spend-as-you-go strategy,
this is, of course, a great success.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we briefly describe
the historical evolution of Norway’s fiscal framework, paying particular attention to the
introduction of the fiscal rule. Section 3 details the model and the estimation procedure.
Section 4 discusses the oil market shocks and analyses their effect on fiscal policy and the
domestic economy. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Fiscal framework in Norway
Since the mid 1990s, Norway has been transferring the totality of its petroleum cash flow to
a sovereign wealth fund. The fund was established in 1990 as the Government Petroleum
Fund; in 2006, it was renamed the Government Pension Fund Global (GPF). The change
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highlighted the fund’s role in saving government revenue to finance an expected increase
in future public pension costs. Despite its name, the fund has no formal pension liabilities.
As emphasized in the introduction, the GPF has characteristics as both a savings and a
stabilization fund. As a savings fund, the main purpose is to build up reserves and save
for future generations. It does so by saving and investing the proceeds from petroleum
export sales, into foreign financial assets. As a stabilization fund; the aim is to protect and
stabilize the budget, and hence the economy, from excess volatility in petroleum revenues,
see Johnson-Calari and Rietveld (2007) for details on saving and stabilization funds.
There was early recognition of the need to separate the saving and the use of petroleum
revenues. At the time the fund was established, Norway’s economic situation was poor,
characterized by large imbalances in the domestic economy after a credit-driven boom
coupled with high government spending. The severe fall in the oil price in 1986 resulted
in large budget deficits and precipitated the tightening of fiscal policy in the years that
followed. The idea of establishing a sovereign wealth fund, with the purpose of first
saving and then investing petroleum income in international capital markets, the product
of which could be used in the Norwegian economy at a later date, was therefore largely
welcomed by politicians and academics, see Lie (2013).4
During the early 1990s, the fund failed to generate a surplus. Under the fiscal policy
guidelines, the impact of the budget on the economy in a normal cyclical situation was
supposed to be approximately neutral. This implied an unchanged use of petroleum
revenues as measured by the structural, non-oil budget balance, see Ministry of Finance
(2001). High oil prices, large surpluses on the government budget and high allocations to
the GPF in the late 1990s, however, made it difficult to maintain a neutral fiscal stance,
i.e., unchanged use of petroleum revenues. In 2001 the government therefore devised a
fiscal policy strategy allowing for a prudent increase in the spending of petroleum revenues.
According to the policy guidelines, only the expected real return on the Fund (projected to
be 4 percent) was to be returned to the budget for general spending purposes, see Ministry
of Finance (2001). The fiscal framework was designed to smooth the spending generated
from the oil wealth, while ensuring that Norway maintained a strong international exposed
sector, thereby insulating the economy from Dutch disease (crowding out of the private
sector).
All the same, fiscal policy plays a role in stabilizing output fluctuations in two impor-
tant ways. First, it stabilizes the fiscal impulse over and above longer term smoothing
by allowing deviations from the 4 percent rule to counteract large cyclical variations in
economic activity or sharp swings in the value of the fund. This is supposed to give
the government maneuverability in fiscal policy should oil prices drop or the mainland
economy contract (or vice versa). As the government states in its white paper, “Fiscal
policy should continue to have the main responsibility for stabilising developments in the
Norwegian economy.” (Ministry of Finance (2001), p. 8). Second, the rule is expressly
defined in terms of the structural non-oil balance, allowing full effect of the automatic
fiscal stabilizers in contrast to inherently procyclical rules on the actual deficit. This to
4The Ministry of Finance did not support the idea at first, as they feared losing control of the budget
process. Eventually, however, the Ministry also gave in, primarily because they did not expect the fund
to generate much of a surplus, see Lie (2013).
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Figure 1. Reduced form evidence: Norway, Sweden and the price of oil
Relative growth in GDP Relative growth in public value added
Note: The left frame displays GDP in mainland Norway relative to GDP in Sweden plotted against the
oil price. The right frame displays value added in the public sector in Norway relative to value added in
the public sector Sweden, plotted against the oil price.
prevent fiscal policy from exacerbating the effect of commodity price fluctuations on the
Norwegian economy.
Since the 2001 adoption of the fiscal rule, the GFP has developed rapidly and is today
the largest sovereign wealth fund in the world. This notwithstanding, very little is actually
known about how, or indeed if, the fiscal rule has worked to shield the domestic economy
from commodity price fluctuations, one of its original intentions. A mere glimpse at some
stylized facts, however, suggests that the Norwegian economy is far from sheltered from
oil price fluctuations. Figure 1 reports the development in GDP of Norway’s mainland
economy relative to GDP in Sweden, an oil importer, together with the price of oil.5
What the figure shows in fact is that the growth in the Norwegian (mainland) economy,
relative to Sweden’s, is highly correlated with the price of oil. This not only holds for
GDP, but for value added in the public sector as well. However, whether this positive
correlation between oil price and relative GDP is due to a procyclical fiscal policy or
other macroeconomic conditions driving up both the oil price and the Norwegian economy
cannot be determined based on these graphs; but this is what we analyse in this paper.
3 The model
The time-varying Dynamic Factor Model (DFM) we develop and employ is particularly
useful for answering our research questions. We describe below our choice of model and
motivations. Technical features of the model, its specifications and the data we have
used, are detailed in subsequent sections, together with a discussion of identification and
estimation.
In the model we identify four factors with associated structural shocks, all motivated
5Apart from Sweden being an oil importer, the two countries share many other important characteristics,
e.g., they are both small and open economies, enjoy good institutions, have a generous welfare state etc.
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by findings in the recent oil-macro literature. First, as stressed in the introduction, the
price of oil should be treated as endogenous insofar as the macroeconomic responses
to higher oil prices differ markedly depending on the cause of the price rise, see e.g.,
Kilian (2009) and Lippi and Nobili (2012) for oil importing countries, and Peersman and
Van Robays (2012), Aastveit et al. (2014), Charnavoki and Dolado (2014) and Bjørnland
and Thorsrud (2015) for several oil exporting countries. Accordingly, we include a measure
of global activity and the real price of oil as two separate factors in the model to capture
developments in the oil market as well as international business cycle conditions. This
allows us in turn to identify two oil market shocks: a global activity shock and an oil
price (specific) shock, both of which increase the real price of oil, though with potentially
very different macroeconomic implications.
Important to our set-up is the separation of a windfall gain due to volume and price
changes when analysing the role of fiscal policy. Previous studies such as Pieschacon
(2012), typically assumes that the output of the resource sector only provides a source of
income from export sales. Hence, there will be no spillover to the rest of the economy
during the process of extracting the resources. Similar conclusions are drawn in Husain
et al. (2008). This is hardly the case for Norway. In particular, as shown theoretically and
empirically in Bjørnland and Thorsrud (2015), when the extraction of resources demands
complicated technical solutions, as it does in Norway, learning-by-doing spillovers from
the resource sector to the non-resource sectors of the economy can be substantial.6 For
this reason the DFM we specify also includes separate activity factors for the resource
and non-resource (domestic) industries of the economy. This allows the public sector
(and the domestic economy in general) to respond differently to a windfall gain due to
an activity shock in the resource sector (new discoveries, increased extraction rates etc.)
and a windfall gain due to higher oil prices.
The four structural shocks, a global activity shock, an oil price (specific) shock, a re-
source activity shock and a domestic activity shock, are identified using a simple recursive
ordering. Our main focus is on the fiscal responses caused by the global activity shock
and the oil price specific shock, which both can affect oil prices. We then ask, has fiscal
policy been less procyclical with higher oil prices since adopting the fiscal policy rule,
and has this contributed to shelter the economy from oil price fluctuations, as was the
intention?
In the DFM, the factors and shocks will be linearly related to a large panel of domestic
variables, including tradable and non-tradable, e.g., public, sectors of the economy. The
large panel is needed to account for the sectoral spillovers that exists between the different
industries of the economy, but also allows us to include a broad range of measures used
in the literature to assess the degree of fiscal pro- or countercyclicality. To account for
changing policy regimes, due to, e.g., the introduction of the fiscal rule in 2001, we allow
for time-varying factor loadings. Finally, to account for changes in the volatility of the
structural shocks, due to, e.g., Great Moderation effects, we allow for stochastic volatility.
Technically, the time-varying DFM used in this paper is most closely related to the
6Similar findings are also found for mineral-abundant Australia in Bjørnland and Thorsrud (2015), and, al-
though using a very different methodology, for a variety of resource-rich countries in Allcott and Keniston
(2014) and Smith (2014).
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set-up used in Del Negro and Otrok (2008).7 We deviate in the way we identify the
latent factors and the factor loadings. Importantly, due to the identifying assumptions we
employ, see Section 3.3, we are able to model the dynamics of the factors as an endogenous
system, and thereby identify structural shocks. For the latter we utilize the framework
proposed by Primiceri (2005).
3.1 A time-varying Dynamic Factor Model
Formally, the observation and transition equations of the time-varying DFM can be writ-
ten as follows:
yt =z0,tat + · · ·+ zs,tat−s + et (1a)
at =Φ1at−1 + · · ·+ Φhat−h + A0−1t Σtt (1b)
et =Φ1et−1 + · · ·+ Φpet−p + Υtut (1c)
Equation (1a) is the observation equation, and the N × 1 vector yt represents the observ-
ables at time t. zj,t is a N×q matrix with dynamic factor loadings for j = 0, 1, · · · , s, and
s denotes the number of lags used for the dynamic factors at.
8 As mentioned above, we
set q = 4 and identify two foreign factors, global activity and the real oil price; and two
domestic factors, one related to the resource sector and the other related to the remaining
non-resource sectors. Note here that the two first (foreign) factors are treated as observ-
ables, while the latter two (domestic) factors are latent. We turn to the identification of
these factors in Section 3.3.
The dynamic factors follow a VAR(h) process, given by the transition equation in (1b).
Note that h > s in our application. We work with the convention that t ∼ i.i.d.N(0, I)
such that the covariance matrix of A0−1t Σtt in (1b) is denoted by Ωt. It follows that:
A0tΩtA0
′
t = ΣtΣ
′
t (2)
where A0t and Σt is a lower triangular matrix and a diagonal matrix, respectively:
A0t =

1 0 · · · 0
ao21,t 1
. . . 0
...
. . . . . .
...
aoq1,t · · · aoqq−1,t 1
 Σt =

σ1,t 0 · · · 0
0 σ2,t
. . . 0
...
. . . . . .
...
0 · · · 0 σq,t
 (3)
7Del Negro and Otrok (2008) apply a time-varying DFM to analyse international business cycle synchro-
nization. Related models have also been applied in Eickmeier et al. (2011), Liu et al. (2014), and Ellis
et al. (2014) to analyse the transmission of US financial shocks and UK specific business cycle devel-
opments. However, time-varying factor models were implemented in the financial literature before the
macro economic literature, see, e.g., Aguilar and West (2000) and Lopes and Carvalho (2007).
8In the proposed model the observables are a function of time-varying factor loadings and covariances.
An alternative assumption would have been to allow for time variation in the parameters associated with
the law of motion for the factors instead, as done in, e.g., Ellis et al. (2014) and Eickmeier et al. (2011).
We do not follow this route. As described in Appendix E, the factor loadings in the observation equation
of the system can be estimated one equation at the time. The parameters of the law of motion for the
factors must be estimated jointly. With four factors and a substantial number of lags in the transition
equation, see Section 3.2, this increases the computational burden considerably, and would likely not
result in any meaningful estimates.
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This decomposition of the covariance matrix Ωt builds on the work of Primiceri (2005), and
facilitates identification of the model’s structural shocks, t, and their associated time-
varying volatility, captured by Σt. In particular, the lower triangular structure of A0t
implies that we can identify the structural shocks using a simple recursive identification
scheme. The economic rational for this choice is elaborated on in Section 3.3.
Lastly, equation (1c) describes the time series process for the N × 1 vector of id-
iosyncratic errors et. We will assume these evolve as independent AR(p) processes with
stochastic volatility. Thus, the parameter matrix Φk for 1 ≤ k ≤ p is:
Φk =

Φ1,k 0 · · · 0
0 Φ2,k
. . . 0
...
. . . . . .
...
0 · · · 0 ΦN,k
 (4)
and similarly to above, denoting the covariance matrix of the heteroscedastic unobservable
shocks in (1c) as Ht, and under the assumption that ut ∼ i.i.d.N(0, I), we have that:
Ht = ΥtΥ
′
t (5)
where Υt is the diagonal matrix:
Υt =

η1,t 0 · · · 0
0 η2,t
. . . 0
...
. . . . . .
...
0 · · · 0 ηN,t
 (6)
The model’s time-varying parameters and stochastic volatilities are assumed to follow
Random walk processes. In particular, let:
Zt = [z0,t, . . . , zs,t]
and zt = vec(Z
′
t) (the matrix Zt stacked by rows) be a vector of the factor loadings at
time t, aot the vector on non-zero and non-one elements of the matrix A0t (stacked by
rows), and finally let σt and ηt be the vectors of diagonal elements of the matrices Σt
and Υt, respectively. The dynamics of the model’s time-varying parameters will thus be
specified as follows:
zt =zt−1 + wt (7a)
aot =aot−1 + st (7b)
hσt =h
σ
t−1 + bt (7c)
hηt =h
η
t−1 + vt (7d)
where hσt = log(σt) and h
η
t = log(ηt)
The time-varying factor loadings are introduced in the DFM to capture potential
changes in how the variables in the domestic economy relates to the factors, and especially
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in systematic fiscal policy. The advantage of this strategy, relative to, e.g., a pure regime-
changing approach, is that we do not need to decide on a certain number of regimes
prior to estimation. Nor do we impose any restrictions enforcing the parameters to return
to previously obtained parameter values. This assumptions seem reasonable to us given
the changing nature of how, e.g., fiscal policy has been conducted in Norway in recent
decades, see Section 2. The random walk assumptions for hσt and h
η
t are common in
the macroeconomic literature entertaining stochastic volatility, and simplify estimation
of the model as no autoregressive parameters need to be estimated. Given the well-
documented changes in elasticities in the oil market in recent decades, see, e.g., Baumeister
and Peersman (2013), and the increase in the resource industry’s share of GDP in Norway
since the early 1980s to today, we also allow aot to vary across time, implying that the
contemporaneous spillovers between the factors in the model are time-varying as well.
All the errors in the model are assumed to be jointly normally distributed, and we
work with the following assumptions on the covariance matrix of the errors:
var


ut
t
wt
st
bt
vt


=

IN 0 0 0 0 0
0 Iq 0 0 0 0
0 0 W 0 0 0
0 0 0 S 0 0
0 0 0 0 B 0
0 0 0 0 0 V

(8)
Here, as already indicated above, IN and Iq are identity matrices of dimension N × N
and q × q. W and S are assumed to be block diagonal matrices:
W =

W1 0 · · · 0
0 W2
. . . 0
...
. . . . . .
...
0 · · · 0 WN
 S =

S1 0 · · · 0
0 S2
. . . 0
...
. . . . . .
...
0 · · · 0 Sq−1
 (9)
where Wi for i = 1, . . . , N is a m×m matrix, with m = q(s+ 1), and S1 is a 1×1 matrix,
S2 is a 2×2 matrix, and so on.9 B is a q× q matrix, while V is a diagonal N ×N matrix.
An important aspect of the restrictions put on (8) is their rendering of the structural
shocks driving the dynamics of transition equation t as independent from the shocks
driving the evolution of the time-varying factor loadings wt (and all other disturbances in
the model). This allows us to utilize the standard SVAR machinery to analyse impulse
responses and variance decompositions to the t shocks, but at the same time identify
changes in, e.g., systematic fiscal policy, captured by the wt shocks. However, less re-
strictive assumptions regarding (8) can be justified, see Primiceri (2005) for a broader
discussion. Nevertheless, relaxing the number of restrictions comes at a price, requiring
us to estimate a substantially larger amount of parameters. As the proposed time-varying
DFM is already heavily parametrized we do not believe this to be a feasible option in the
current setting.
9That is, S1 is associated with ao21,t in (3), S2 is associated with ao31,t and ao32,t in (3), etc.
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3.2 Model specification and data
In the model specification used to produce our main results we allow for one lag of the
dynamic factors in the observation equation (1a) of the system, i.e., s = 1. This is
somewhat more restrictive than what was found to fit the data best in a related study
analysing spillovers from the oil sector on the Norwegian economy, albeit with constant
parameters, employed in Bjørnland and Thorsrud (2015). On the other hand, allowing for
time-varying parameters increases the potential for good model fit, and therefore also the
need for many lags in the observation equation of the system. Further, as shown in, e.g.,
Hamilton and Herrera (2004) among others, a large number of lags are needed to capture
the dynamics in the oil-macro relationship. For this reason we allow for up to eight lags
in equation (1b) describing the law of motion of the factors, implying that h = 8. Finally,
to capture autocorrelation in the observables not explained by the common factors we set
p = 1 in the autoregressive processes for the idiosyncratic errors.
To accommodate resource movement and spending effects within the petroleum ex-
porting economy, as well the potential for learning spillovers between the resource sector
and the rest of the economy, the observable yt vector includes a broad range of sectoral
employment, production and wage series, see also Bjørnland and Thorsrud (2015). Turn-
ing to the fiscal variables, as described in, e.g., Kaminsky et al. (2004), many indicators
can be used to assess the degree of pro- or countercyclical fiscal policy. An advantage with
the factor model methodology is that we can look at many of these at the same time, pos-
sibly allowing for more robust conclusions. For this reason we include value added, wages,
and employment in the public sector from the quarterly national account statistics. From
the central government fiscal account we utilize fiscal revenues, expenditures, transfers to
municipalities, and operating costs. Naturally, we also include the real exchange rate, a
core variable in the Dutch disease literature. A full description of the data is given in
Appendix A.
The two variables meant to capture the developments in the international commodity
market are the real price of oil and a world economic activity indicator. The real price
of oil is constructed on the basis of Brent Crude oil prices (U.S. dollars), deflated using
the U.S. CPI. Our main consideration when constructing the global (or world) activity
indicator was to include countries whose economic activity is most likely to affect the
global oil market. In addition, to capture possible direct trade linkages, we include the
most important trading partners. Hence, for Norway, we construct global activity as the
simple mean of four-quarter logarithmic changes in real GDP in Denmark, Germany, the
Netherlands, Sweden, the UK, Japan, China, and the U.S.
In sum, this gives a panel of roughly 50 international and domestic data series, covering
a sample period from 1981:Q1 to 2012:Q4. Correcting for the number of lags imposed
on the model leaves us with 124 observations that are used for estimation, covering the
sample 1983:Q1-2012:Q4.10 To capture the economic fluctuations of interest, we transform
all variables to year-on-year growth. Lastly, we remove the local mean (of the growth
10The sample periods reflect the longest possible time for which a full panel of observables is available.
The vintage of quarterly national account statistics we use was generously provided to us by Statistics
Norway. In the official statistics, these numbers (for employment) do not cover the earlier part of our
sample. The prolonged vintage of data ends in 2012:Q4.
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rates) and then standardize the resulting data before estimation.11
3.3 Identification
As is common for all factor models, the factors and factor loadings in (1) are not identified
without restrictions. To separately identify the factors and the loadings, and to be able to
provide an economic interpretation of the factors, we enforce the following identification
restrictions on z0,t in (1a):
λ0,t =
[
λ˜0,t
λˆ0,t
]
, for t = 0, 1, . . . , T (10)
where λ˜0,t is a q× q identity matrix, and λˆ0,t is left unrestricted. As shown in Bai and Ng
(2013) and Bai and Wang (2012), these restrictions uniquely identify the dynamic factors
and the loadings, but leave the VAR(h) dynamics for the factors completely unrestricted.
Accordingly, the innovations to the factors, t, can be linked to structural shocks that are
implied by economic theory.
The first two factors in the system, world activity and the real price of oil, are treated
as observables and naturally load with one on the corresponding element in the yt vector.
The latent domestic factors, resource and non-resource activity, must be inferred from the
data. To ensure unique identification we require the domestic resource factor to load with
one on value added in the petroleum sector, and the domestic non-resource factor to load
with one on total value added excluding petroleum. Note that while these restrictions
identify the factors, the factors and the observables are not necessarily identical since we
use the full information set (the vector yt) to extract the factors.
Based on the recursive structure of A0t in (3), we identify four structural shocks: a
global activity shock; an oil price specific shock; and two domestic shocks: a resource
and non-resource activity shock, respectively. That is, at = [a
gact
t , a
oil
t , a
r
t , a
nr
t ]
′, where
[gact, oil, r, nr] denote global activity, oil price, resource activity and non-resource activity.
Accordingly, the vector with structural disturbances is:
t = [
gact
t , 
oil
t , 
r
t , 
nr
t ]
′ (11)
As implied by A0t, we follow the usual assumption made by both theoretical and
empirical models of the commodity market, and restrict global activity to respond to oil
price disturbances with a lag. This restriction is consistent with the sluggish behavior of
global economic activity after each of the major oil price hikes in recent decades, see e.g.,
Hamilton (2009). Furthermore, we do not treat commodity prices as exogenous to the rest
of the global macro economy. Any unexpected news regarding global activity is assumed
to affect real oil prices contemporaneously. This is consistent with recent work in the oil
market literature, see, e.g., Kilian (2009), Lippi and Nobili (2012), and Aastveit et al.
(2014). In contrast to these papers, and to keep our empirical model as parsimonious as
11As the transformed stationary data inhabits very different volatilities, we do the standardization to make
the estimation less sensitive to the prior specifications. See Appendix A for details.
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possible, we do not explicitly identify a global commodity supply shock.12 Turning to the
domestic factors, in the very short run, disturbances originating in the Norwegian economy
can not affect global activity and the price of oil. These are plausible assumptions insofar
as Norway is a small, open economy. However, both of the domestic factors respond to
unexpected disturbances in global activity and the real oil price on impact. In small open
economies such as Norway’s, news regarding global activity will affect variables such as the
exchange rate, the interest rate, asset prices, and consumer sentiment contemporaneously,
and in consequence overall demand in the economy. Norway is also an oil exporter, and
any disturbances to the real price of oil will most likely rapidly affect both the demand
and supply side of the economy.
The restrictions suggested here are motivated by the Dutch disease theory model
presented in Bjørnland and Thorsrud (2015). As in that study, and as argued above, the
identification scheme employed is needed to correctly quantify the domestic spillovers from
unexpected windfall gains and changing international business cycle conditions in a small
and open resource-rich economy. However, in contrast to the Bjørnland and Thorsrud
(2015) study, the domestic shocks and their spillovers are not in focus here and we do
not discuss them other than to emphasize that by including the rt shock we are able to
control for the fact that the domestic economy, and the public sector in particular, might
respond differently to a windfall gain due to an activity shock in the resource sector and
a windfall gain due to higher oil prices, see the discussion in Section 3.
We note that all observable variables in the model, apart from the ones used to identify
the factors, may respond to all shocks on impact inasmuch as they are contemporaneously
related to the factors through the unrestricted part of the loading matrix (i.e., the λˆ0,t
matrix in equation (10)). The recursive structure is therefore only applied to identify the
shocks. Together, equations (10) and (11) make the structural DFM uniquely identified.
3.4 Estimation
We estimate the time-varying DFM using Bayesian estimation, decomposing the problem
of drawing from the joint posterior of the parameters of interest into a set of much sim-
pler ones using Gibbs simulations. Gibbs simulations are a particular variant of Markov
Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods that samples a high dimensional joint posterior by
drawing from a set of lower dimensional conditional posteriors. The Gibbs simulation we
employ is described in greater detail in Appendix E. Here we describe in brief the sampling
algorithm, which consists of sequentially drawing the model’s unobserved state variables,
at, et, zt, aot, h
σ
t , and h
η
t , and hyper-parameters, Φ, Φ, W , S, B, and V , utilizing 7 blocks
until convergence is achieved. In essence, each block involves exploiting the state space
nature of the model using the Kalman filter and the simulation smoother suggested by
Carter and Kohn (1994).
In Block 1, conditional on the data (y˜T ), and all the hyper-parameters and state
variables less a˜T , equations (1a) and (1b) constitute a standard linear and conditionally
12However, as shown in Kilian (2009), and a range of subsequent papers, such supply shocks explain a
trivial fraction of the total variance in the price of oil, and do not account for a large fraction of the
variation in real activity either.
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Gaussian state space system, with a˜T unknown. Accordingly, the simulation smoother
proposed by Carter and Kohn (1994) is straight forwardly applied. Conditional on a˜T ,
equation (1b) is independent of the rest of the system, and reflects a time-varying VAR
model. Hence, in Blocks 2 to 4 of the sampler, we can simulate from the conditional
posterior distribution of a˜oT , h˜
sigma
T , Φ, S and B using the same procedures as described in,
e.g., Primiceri (2005). In essence, this simulation consists of three blocks that sequentially
draws from the conditional posterior of Φ, a˜oT , S, h˜
σ
T , and B, in that order, and where
the sampling of the time-varying states relies on small reformulations of the system such
that the standard simulation smoother can be employed. Especially, we note that to be
able to sample h˜σT we rely on the method presented in Kim et al. (1998), using mixtures
of Normal distributions. Drawing from the conditional posterior of S and B is standard,
since it is the product of independent Inverse-Wishart distributions.
In Block 5, conditional on the data and all the hyper-parameters and state variables
less z˜T , equations (1a) and (1b) again constitute a standard state space system, but now
with z˜T unknown. In the same manner as above, we can use the standard simulation
smoother to simulate the conditional posterior of z˜T . Conditional on z˜T , equation (7a) is
independent of the rest of the system, and is easy to sample from the conditional posterior
of W using the Inverse-Wishart distribution.
Finally, in Blocks 6 and 7, conditional on the data, a˜T , and z˜T , we can infer e˜T .
Moreover, conditionally on e˜T , the structure of equation (1c) is similar to that of equation
(1b), and the same procedures as those described for Blocks 2 to 4 above, can therefore
be applied here too. The problem is now somewhat simpler, however, since we do not
need to sample time-varying covariances, only variances. That is, conditionally on e˜T and
hηt , we can sample Φ, and conditional on e˜T and Φ, we can sample h
η
t , and consequently,
V .
Due to the high dimensionality of the model, it is important to allow for a large number
of posterior draws. The simulations in this paper are all based on 20000 iterations of the
Gibbs sampler. The first 14000 are discarded and only every sixth of the remaining
iterations are used for inference. As shown in Appendix C the convergence checks seem
satisfactory.
To implement the MCMC algorithm we need priors for the initial state variables a0,
z0, ao0, h
σ
0 , and h
η
0, and for the hyper-parameters Φ, S, B, W , Φ and V . The prior
specification used in the benchmark model is documented and rationalized in Appendix
D. There we also report various sensitivity analyses showing that our main results are
robust to a set of alternative assumptions.
4 Oil market shocks and systematic fiscal policy
In the following we examine the estimated responses to a set of fiscal and macroeconomic
variables from the two oil market shocks. Our aim is to analyze the response of fiscal policy
to different commodity price shocks over time, and in so doing, examine to what extent
fiscal policy has contributed to insulate the domestic economy from the effects of the
commodity price fluctuations, or, conversely, to exacerbate those effects. To organize the
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discussion, we will in particular examine whether we can observe changes in the response
patterns prior to and after the introduction of the fiscal rule in 2001.
A complicating factor is the use in the literature of different measures of fiscal policy
to gauge the degree of pro- or countercyclical fiscal policy.13 This makes it difficult
to compare results across studies. In the following we will define fiscal policy to be
procyclical (countercyclical) for a given oil market shock if public value added, public
wages, public employment, government spending, government operating costs, or transfers
increase (decrease) following oil market shocks that increase the price of oil. We will first
examine the impulse responses in the level of the public variables (as in Pieschacon (2012))
and then relative to GDP (as Ce´spedes and Velasco (2014) and others analyse). Finally,
using the data from the central government accounts we define the primary balance as
income (non-oil tax revenues) minus spending. A procyclical (countercyclical) fiscal policy
implies that the primary balance responds negatively (positively) to positive oil market
shocks, i.e, increasing (decreasing) spending ahead of income. In sum, these definitions
follow more or less the same usage as in Kaminsky et al. (2004). Note however, that
our focus is not to measure average responses in fiscal policy, as they do, but to analyse
whether fiscal policy responses have changed over time for a given oil market shock.
4.1 The Great Moderation, Recession and the global
oil market
We start by examining whether there has been a change in the volatility of shocks, so as
to control for changing volatility when comparing fiscal responses over time. As shown
in the first row of Figure 2, the volatility of the structural oil market shocks has indeed
varied considerable over the sample. There is a marked decline in the volatility of the
global activity shock during the 1980s and 1990s, but a subsequent pick up of volatility
at the end of the sample. These “facts” are well known and commonly attributed to the
Great Moderation and the Great Recession. The structural oil price shock also shows
evidence of declining volatility in periods (i.e., during the 1990s), but with marked spikes
of heightened volatility, in the late 1980s (the first Gulf War) and during the Great
Recession. Similar patterns have also been reported in Baumeister and Peersman (2013),
who explain the decline by a fall in oil supply elasticity.
The last two rows of Figure 2 report the impulse responses for world activity and the
real price of oil following a world activity shock (left column) and an oil price shock (right
column) for three different time periods; early (1983), intermediate (1997), and late (2012)
in the sample.14 The results confirm that our identified oil market shocks are in line with
the results found in the oil market literature: After an unexpected one standard deviation
increase in global activity, the price of oil rises substantially on impact, reflecting that
13For instance, while Pieschacon (2012) analyses impulse responses in government purchases and transfers
to an exogenous oil price shock, Ce´spedes and Velasco (2014) estimate the effect of a change in commodity
price on government expenditures relative to GDP. Others again do not control for shocks at all, and
simply compare the fiscal impulse as a percentage of GDP relative to, say, the change in the output gap,
see e.g. Lopez-Murphy and Villafuerte (2010) and Taka´ts (2012) among many others.
14As will be discussed in more detail below, the dates also reflect three comparable periods when fiscal
policy was governed by different fiscal regimes. Details for all time periods can be obtained on request.
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Figure 2. Time-varying volatility and oil market shocks
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Note: The first row reports the estimated standard deviation of the shocks across time. The color shadings
represent the 70, 50, and 30 percent quantiles of the posterior distribution. The black line is the median
estimate. The line is solid (dotted) whenever the median estimate is outside (inside) the 70 percent
quantile in 2001:Q1. The two next rows report estimated impulse responses at three different periods of
time. The initial shock correspond to a one standard deviation innovation (of the normalized data). All
responses are reported in levels (of the normalized data).
the price of oil is not exogenous to the macro economy, see, e.g., Kilian (2009), Lippi and
Nobili (2012). Moreover, after a one standard deviation shock to the real price of oil,
world activity falls, although with a lag. This is consistent with the fact that it takes
time before the higher production costs associated with the higher oil price work their
way through to actual output, see, e.g., Hamilton (2009).
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Note also the differences in the response path of world activity and the real oil price
to shocks over time. The differences in impact responses reflect the changes in volatility
of the structural shocks, as already documented. However, we also observe some changes
in the response path that relate to the changes in the overall covariance structure of the
oil market, see Section 3.1 and equation (3). In particular, a world activity shock has
stronger impact on the oil price at the end of the sample (2012) than it has in the earlier
part of the sample (1983). This is consistent with studies documenting the important
role for global demand as a driver for the real price of oil the last decade, see, Aastveit
et al. (2014). For the oil price shock, the changing effects on world activity across time
are minor, with the middle 1990s displaying slightly less volatile oil price shocks, and
subsequently also a milder downturn in the world economy.
4.2 Procyclical or countercyclical fiscal policy?
Below we discuss the fiscal responses to the two oil market shocks, i.e., global activity and
oil price specific shocks. First, Figure 3 compares the evolution of the responses of some
key variables in the public sector (value added, wages, employment and spending) to an
oil price specific shock that increases the price of oil. In each row, we first graph impulse
responses for three specific periods in time: 1983, 1997, and 2012. The dates are chosen
to reflect three comparable periods: the initial discovery period during which spending
increased rapidly; the period just after the GPF started to generate some revenue (but
fiscal policy was yet to governed by a rule, but was intended to remain neutral over the
business cycle); and 10 years after the adoption of the fiscal rule. The two subsequent
graphs offer more detail on the time-varying responses after 1 and 4 quarters, but now
measured over the whole sample, and with probability bands representing the 70, 50, and
30 percent quantiles of the posterior distribution. Figure 4 displays similar responses, but
now due to a positive global activity shock.15
Starting with the oil price specific shock, i.e., an increase in the oil price that is not
due to increased global activity, a few results stand out. First, fiscal policy responds
procyclically to the oil price shock over the sample, even more so after the 2001 adoption
of the fiscal framework. In particular, the positive effects of an oil price shock on value
added, real wages, employment, and spending in the public sector are more pronounced
today than in the decade preceding the rule, and for value added and spending, also more
procyclical than in the 1980s, see Figure 3.
If we turn now to the global activity shock that spurred a rise in oil prices, the emerging
picture is somewhat more nuanced, with some components of public spending (value added
and spending) alternating between countercyclical to acyclical during the last decade,
while wages, in particular, shifts from a countercyclical pattern in the 1980s to a clearly
procyclical pattern after 2001, see Figure 4. The main message to take from this is still that
of a tendency for more (not less) fiscal procyclicality since the adoption of the spending
rule. This suggests that following a global downturn accompanied by a contraction of
the domestic economy, there is less room for fiscal policy maneuvering. Figures 10 and
15Note that from now on we normalize the oil market shocks such that we compare similarly sized innova-
tions across time (see the discussion in Section 4.1).
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Figure 3. Oil price specific shock and the public sector: Time-varying responses
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Note: The first column displays estimated impulse responses at three different periods of time. The initial
shock is normalized to one percent (of the normalized data). All responses are reported in levels (of the
normalized data). The subsequent two columns report a snapshot of the responses across the whole sample
for two specific response horizons. The color shadings represent the 70, 50, and 30 percent quantiles of
the posterior distribution. The black line is the median estimate. The line is solid (dotted) whenever the
median estimate is outside (inside) the 70 percent quantile in 2001:Q1. Finally, we plot a vertical line in
2001:Q1 to indicate the introduction of the fiscal rule.
11 (Appendix B.2) provide more detail on the procylicality of fiscal policy by analysing
the effect on additional public sector variables. The graphs show that the increased fiscal
procyclicality was particularly pronounced for spending (excluding pensions) and transfers
to municipalities, while the increase in administrative expenses to oil price shocks has been
more muted over the sample.
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Figure 4. Global activity shock and the public sector: Time-varying responses
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Note: See Figure 3.
Summarizing, we find clear evidence of nonlinearities in the responses of fiscal policy
to commodity market shocks. In particular, public spending, employment, and wages
have responded significantly more (not less) procyclically to the oil market shocks since
the adoption of the fiscal policy framework.
4.3 Transmission of shocks and the domestic economy
According to Pieschacon (2012), the fiscal framework adopted by Norway shields the
economy from oil price fluctuations, implying only minor responses in domestic variables
following an oil price shock. She further claims that had Norway been more like Mexico,
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Figure 5. Time-varying variance decompositions
P
u
b
li
c
v
a
lu
e
a
d
d
e
d
Horizon 1 Horizon 4 Horizon 8
G
D
P
d
o
m
e
st
ic
e
co
n
o
m
y
Note: The plots report the median of the estimated variance decompositions associated with the levels
response of the variables.
without the fiscal policy framework in place, Norway would have had a larger share of
variance in the domestic variables attributed to the oil price shock.16 Our focus here is
not to compare Norway with Mexico, but to examine the extent to which the adoption of
the fiscal rule contributed to lessen exposure to oil market shocks.17 This is done in Figure
5. It shows the contribution of the different shocks in the model to the variance in public
value added and domestic GDP, measured as the average over all domestic industries
except the public sector, over time. We focus on the role of oil price and global activity
shocks, marked blue and dark blue, respectively, for horizons 1, 4, and 8.
Two features stand out. First, there is a marked difference in the role played by oil
price shocks in explaining activity in the public sector since 2001. One year after the
shock occurs (horizon 4), more than 40 percent of the variance in public value added is
explained by oil price shocks by the end of the sample (2012), compared to 10 percent
prior to the adoption of the fiscal rule (1998/1999). This pattern holds for all public
variables (results can be obtained on request) and clearly emphasizes the increased role of
oil price shocks in fiscal policy since 2001. Global activity shocks, on the other hand, do
not explain much of the variance of the last decade.18 It is noteworthy that our findings
encompass those in Pieschacon (2012), although we reach opposite conclusions. That is,
based on an estimation period from 1986 to 2005 she finds that approximately 10 percent
16The arguments are based on a counterfactual experiment, in which Norway and Mexico change parame-
ters, but otherwise face their original shocks.
17Clearly, there may be many reasons why Norway is less exposed to oil market shocks than Mexico,
including, for instance, less corruption, more efficient bureaucracy, less mature oil sector etc.
18For some public variables, i.e., public wages and spending, global activity shocks explain slightly more of
the variance the last decade, but always less than the variance explained by the oil price shock.
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of government purchases are explained by oil price shocks after two years, which is not
very different from what we also observe on average for the same period, see Figure 5.
However, and as seen above, from 2001 the pattern changes markedly, suggesting increased
exposure of the public sector to the oil market shocks.
Second, and turning to GDP in the domestic economy, we find that the oil price specific
shocks explain more than 10 percent of the variance in the domestic variables at horizon
4. This is more than twice as much as is being explained in Pieschacon (2012). We also
find an increase in the share explained by oil price shocks since 2001, albeit not to the
extent of the public sector. Finally, the global activity shocks play an increasing role for
GDP throughout the sample and in particular during the commodity price boom (the last
decade). Impulse responses for GDP are reported in Figures 12 and 13 in Appendix B.3.
As seen there, GDP responds positively to an oil price specific shock, and the responses
are somewhat stronger today (2012) than in the pre-rule periods (1997). After a world
activity shock the responses are very much the same as those in 1997.
As the above discussion shows there is evidence of nonlinearity also in the response
of the domestic economy to oil market shocks, suggesting a stronger pass-through of oil
related shocks to the economy after the 2001 adoption of the fiscal rule. In short, then,
the fiscal framework does not effectively shield the economy from oil price fluctuations. If
anything, fiscal policy has exacerbated the effects of the oil market shocks on the domestic
economy, and even more so after the adoption of the fiscal rule. If Norway has a more
muted response to oil price shocks than countries like Mexico, as argued in Pieschacon
(2012), it must be for other reasons than the adoption of the fiscal rule.
Having said that, one can easily argue that if the private sector is also stimulated by
the two shocks that increase oil prices, as indicated by the results in Figures 12 and 13
in Appendix B.3, maybe the stimulus to the public sector is just following the increase in
the domestic economy. Some studies, i.e., Ce´spedes and Velasco (2014) and Husain et al.
(2008), estimate the effect of a change in commodity prices on government expenditures
relative to GDP, and find that measured in relative terms, fiscal policy has been counter-
cyclical. Figure 6 addresses this issue, as well as highlighting the importance of separating
between the shocks driving the oil market and their domestic implications. In particular,
the figure reports the response, across time and horizons, of value added, wages and em-
ployment in the public sector relative to the response in the domestic economy.19 A value
above zero indicates the public sector responds more positively to the given shock than
the private sector. The last row in the figure reports the effect on the primary balance.
We find that for a given oil price shock, the public sector has clearly grown at the
expense of the private sector. That is, throughout the last decade, the positive effect
on the public sector has grown relative to the private sector. This again suggests fiscal
policy exacerbates the effect of the oil price shocks on the domestic economy. This is
quite different to what Pieschacon (2012) and others have asserted. There it is argued
that fiscal policy regulates the size of the pass-through. Turning to global activity shocks,
the results are reversed. The positive effect on GDP is stronger than that on the public
sector; as seen by the negative effect in the figures. Hence, when the oil price rises due to
19To enhance comparison across the graphs the global activity and real oil price specific shocks are nor-
malized to 1 and 10 percent, respectively.
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Figure 6. Public sector relative to the domestic economy and the primary balance
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Note: Each plot reports the response, across time (x-axis) and horizons (y-axis), of an outcome variable in
the public sector relative to the response in the domestic economy. Here, the domestic economy is defined
as the average response across all sectors, except the public sector (for wages the domestic economy is
defined by the Statistics Norway as mainland economy). The initial shock is normalized to 1 percent (of
the normalized data). All responses are reported in levels (of the normalized data). A value above zero
indicates a more positive response by the public sector to the given shock than by the mainland economy as
a whole. For readability the relative responses are also smoothed by applying a 3 quarter moving average
transformation. See the text for the definition of the primary balance.
global demand, the direct spillovers to the domestic economy are substantial, and much
stronger than the pass-through via government spending. Yet we note that since the start
of the millennium, the spillovers to the private sector (relative to the public sector) have
diminished, in line with the more procyclical fiscal policy responses reported above.
The transmission of shocks via the primary balance confirms our claim. Following an
oil price shock that generates procyclical fiscal responses, we would expect to see negative
numbers for the primary balance, all else being equal. We see evidence of this in the lower
right frame of Figure 6. However, all else is not equal, as emphasized above. In particular,
the oil market shocks are also transmitted to the domestic economy, implying increased
tax-receipts and an improvement in the primary balance: hence the more muted response
in Figure 6. For the global activity shock, however, we should observe positive numbers
for the primary balance, since the stimulus to the domestic economy (and subsequent
tax-receipts) is more substantial now than the effect via increased public spending. This
is confirmed in the lower left frame in Figure 6. However, note also the steep decline
in the prime balance from 2000/2001, consistent with the findings of a more procyclical
fiscal policy in recent times.
We therefore conclude that studies suggesting a countercyclical fiscal policy response,
as a share of GDP or based on the primary balance, in the recent boom, should attribute
it to global activity shocks and their domestic propagation, rather than the adopted fiscal
framework.
4.4 Causes and counterfactuals
After reading our conclusion, a natural question arises. Why did the fiscal rule induce,
against it’s intentions, a procyclical fiscal policy with regard to oil price fluctuations?
According to the guidelines, income from the petroleum sector should be gradually phased
into the economy by using only the expected real return (estimated to be 4 percent of
GPF). This should avoid oil price developments from feeding directly into public spending
and adversely affecting the domestic economy. In addition, considerable emphasis should
be placed on stabilizing fluctuations in the economy by using discretion over the cycle.20
The answer is obvious. When the rule was established, in 2001, the Fund’s market
value amounted to roughly 20 percent of Norwegian GDP. Going forward, the fiscal au-
thorities assumed the price of oil would remain more or less unchanged, at 200 NOK per
barrel. This expectation turned out to be wrong. During the 10-year period from 2001
to 2011, the price of oil increased considerably, to over 600 NOK per barrel. Accordingly,
the inflow of money to the Fund was much higher than expected, and by 2013 its market
value exceeded 180 percent of Norwegian GDP. Thus, almost by construction, it has been
difficult to restrain the close to automatic increase in spending that has followed from
20“The value of the Government Petroleum Fund will depend on developments in oil prices and the return
on the Fund. Adverse effects could occur if wide fluctuations in the Fund’s return were to feed through to
the mainland economy as a result of changes in the use of petroleum revenues over the Fiscal Budget. In
order to counter any such fluctuations, the expected real return on the Fund, and not the actual return,
should be the basis for the phasing in of petroleum revenues [...] In the event of extraordinary, substantial
changes in the Fund’s capital or in the structural, non-oil deficit from one year to the next, the change in
the use of petroleum revenues must be distributed over several years” (Ministry of Finance (2001), p. 7).
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Figure 7. The price of oil and spending revisions
Note: Spending revisions refer to the difference between the assumed path for the fiscal rule in the budget
year 2014 (in percentage of GDP) minus the assumed path in the original budget in 2001 (in percentage
of GDP).
taking out a constant fraction (4 percent) of a Fund that, for long periods, has been
highly correlated with the oil price.21
Figure 7 illustrates this point, and shows the close connection between the growth in
the price of oil and the revisions of the fiscal rule from 2001 to 2014. Over this period, the
4 percent rule has been revised upwards in line with growth in the oil price. According to
our results, the discretionary deviations from the 4 percent rule that may have taken place
during the recent commodity boom have simply not been large enough to counteract the
changes in structural policy parameters induced by the introduction of the rule and the
associated increase in spending potential from the higher commodity prices.
To shed more light on the implications of the fiscal rule relative to some alternatives,
we run a counterfactual experiment and ask how fiscal policy might have been conducted
using parameters from the late 1990s (1997); representing the period before Norway in-
troduced the fiscal framework. Instead, the fiscal authorities followed guidelines implying
an unchanged use of petroleum revenues (as measured by the structural, non-oil budget
balance), see Section 2.22
21That developments in the Fund have been highly correlated with the oil price in the past ten years has
also been emphasized by Norges-Bank (2012).
22Technically, we first construct a historical decomposition of the data given the structural shocks and time-
varying parameters of our baseline model. We then compute the time path for key (public) observable
variables implied by the structural shocks in the model. In the counterfactual experiment we re-compute
this historical decomposition, but now, starting in 1997:Q1, using factor loading estimates from that
period. Accordingly, the historical decomposition computed in the counterfactual experiment will be
identical to the baseline decomposition up to 1997. From this period on, the decompositions will differ
because the systematic policy parameters will differ. However, a general objection to a counterfactual
experiment like this is that if rational and forward-looking economic agents had realized that the policy
parameters would not change, they could have modified their behavior accordingly, and therefore also
the aggregate economic outcomes (c.f., Lucas (1976)). Still, as argued in Primiceri (2005), in a Bayesian
setting where the policy parameters are random, the critique in Lucas (1976) might not be that severe,
and the counterfactual experiment might yield interesting results.
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Figure 8. Counterfactual: Value added in public sector
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Note: We graph the historical decomposition of the data, f(yi,t), minus the counter factual alternative,
f c(yi,t). A positive/negative difference, i.e., whenever the dotted black line is above/below zero, means
the growth rate (year-on-year) would have been higher/lower under the counterfactual scenario. We use
the factor loadings as implied by the estimates in 1997:Q1. The shaded grey area represents recession
while the shaded white areas are periods of expansion (NBER conventions). The color shadings represent
the 70, 50, and 30 percent quantiles of the posterior distribution.
Figure 8 reports the results of the counterfactual experiment. It shows the difference
between the historical decomposition obtained from the baseline model and the coun-
terfactual decomposition using the parameters from 1997. A value above zero indicates
the difference is positive and that under the counterfactual scenario fiscal policy would
have been more expansionary (and vice versa if the difference is negative). To relate
the counterfactual policy to the business cycle, we also report periods of expansions and
recessions in the Norwegian economy in the white and grey area respectively.23 A more
countercyclical policy implies that the differences in the decompositions increase (a more
expansionary policy) when the business cycle conditions are low (grey area) or decrease
(a more contractionary policy) when the business cycle conditions are good (white area).
The figure suggests that during the low growth period in the Norwegian economy in the
early 2000s, the fiscal impulse would have been slightly stronger had policy been based on
the counterfactual policy parameters. Conversely during the high growth period in the
middle 2000s, the fiscal impulse is smaller based on the counterfactual policy parameters.
Finally, during the Great Recession episode, the difference first widens (as the counterfac-
tual is more expansionary in the global recession), but then narrows sharply as economic
conditions improve after the Great Recession. In sum, fiscal policy would have been more
countercyclical under the counterfactual scenario.
An objection to the story told above is that the introduction of the fiscal rule did
not necessarily cause a shift towards a more procyclical fiscal policy. Monetary policy
also changed around this time. During the 1980s and 1990s, Norway practised a quasi
fixed exchange rate regime, which may have limited the role of monetary policy. With
23We follow NBER business cycle conventions and define an expansion as the period from the through to
the peak of the business cycle while the recession is defined as the period from the peak to the through.
The cycles are constructed using the Hodrick-Prescott filter (λ = 40000) for mainland GDP in Norway.
26
the formal adoption of inflation targeting in 2001 (but informally as early as 1999, see
Gjedrem (1999)), monetary policy was given a more active role for economic stabilisation;
“Monetary policy shall also underpin fiscal policy by contributing to stabilising develop-
ments in output and inflation. The implementation of monetary policy shall, in keeping
with this, be oriented towards low and stable inflation of approximately 2.5 percent over
time.” (Ministry of Finance (2001), p. 8). Interestingly, this mechanism is confirmed
when we include the short term interest rate and inflation in the model. For brevity’s
sake, the figures are reported in Appendix B.3. From these results we observe that the
pass-through from world activity and oil-specific shocks to inflation increase markedly
around the turn of the millennium, the period from which fiscal policy also becomes more
procyclical. Monetary policy now turns countercyclical, responding more timely to the
inflation pressure.
Thus, with monetary policy taking a more active role in stabilizing the economy, we
can not exclude an easing of the burden on fiscal policy for stabilization, allowing for
a more expansionary fiscal policy during oil price booms. We doubt, however, whether
this is the only explanation. Such a strategy would have implied a loss of credibility,
with strong price and cost inflation leading to considerable restructuring problems for
the international exposed sector (Dutch disease). We find no such evidence in the data.
Instead we find that fiscal policy has been governed by a rule, which has turned out to
be far more expansionary than anticipated, allowing for procyclical fiscal policy the last
decade.24
Finally, the feasibility of the counterfactual experiment can be questioned. As already
mentioned in Section 2, the fiscal rule was introduced in response to the large surpluses
on the government budget and high allocations to the GPF in the late 1990s. This made
it politically difficult to maintain a neutral fiscal stance, i.e., unchanged use of petroleum
revenues. Without the rule, fiscal policy could have become even more expansionary
during the boom than it actually did. Such political dilemmas are not part of our coun-
terfactual experiment, however.
5 Conclusion
This paper analyses whether the adoption of fiscal spending rules insulates the domestic
economy from commodity price fluctuations in resource-rich economies. In pursuing the
question we develop a time-varying Dynamic Factor Model, in which both the volatility
of structural shocks and the systematic fiscal policy responses are allowed to change
over time. We focus on Norway, a country whose handling of its resource wealth has
been described as exemplary. Unlike most oil exporters, Norway has a fiscal framework
designed specifically to shield the domestic economy from oil price fluctuations. We find
that, contrary to common perceptions, fiscal policy has been more (not less) procyclical
24We also find it difficult to see whether a change in monetary policy regime would affect the parameters
for, e.g., employment and wage formation in the public sector, which based on the results reported earlier
also have become markedly more procyclical. In line with this, our other results remain unchanged after
we augment the model with monetary policy and inflation.
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with oil price fluctuations since the adoption of the fiscal rule. In so doing, fiscal policy
has not effectively sheltered the economy from oil market shocks.
While there may be a variety of explanations of this phenomenon, for instance; large
inflow of money to the Fund during times when the oil price or the global economy
booms; insufficient use of discretion; and stronger role for monetary policy in stabilising
economic growth, the conclusion is that resource-rich Norway needs to find mechanisms
that will enable fiscal policy to be conducted in a more neutral or stabilizing way when
oil prices, and hence also the value of the Fund, fluctuate. From a policy point of view,
the implications of our findings are therefore of practical importance.
Finally, we note, that although the fiscal rule has not managed to shelter the Norwegian
economy from oil price fluctuations, many of the other goals set out in the official policy
documents have been achieved. The fiscal authorities have managed to actually follow
the rule, and by only using roughly 4 percent of the Fund every year, the Norwegian
government has saved a large amount of money for future generations. Compared to
many other resource-rich economies practising a more spend-as-you-go strategy, this is a
great success.
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Appendices
Appendix A Data
Table 1. Data
Source Variable Empl. Trans. Description
N
a
t
io
n
a
l
A
c
c
o
u
n
t
Res. extraction x 11 Oil and natural gas extraction/mining
Res. service x 11 Service activities in oil and gas/mining
Manufacturing x 11 Manufacturing
Construction x 11 Construction
Retail x 11 Wholesale and retail trade
Transp. ocean x 11 Ocean transport
Transportation x 11 Transport activities excl. ocean transport
Hotel and food x 11 Accommodation and food service activities
Financial x 11 Financial and insurance activities
Scientific x 11 Professional, scientific and technical activities
Business x 11 Administrative and support service activities
Non-resource x 11 Total excl. oil and gas extraction/mining
Public x 11 General government
Public consumption 11 General government
Wages petroleum 11 Wages petroleum sector
Wages public 11 Wages public sector
Wages non-res. 11 Total excl. wages to petroleum sector
F
is
c
a
l
a
c
c
o
u
n
t
Spending 11 Central government total expenditures
Spending excl. pensions 11 Central government total expenditures excluding pensions
Operating costs 11 Central government operating costs
Transfers 11 Central government transfers to municipalities and county authorities
Tax revenue 9 Tax revenue excl. petroleum
Tax revenue petroleum 9 Tax revenue from petroleum
I
n
t
.
World activity 11 World economic activity indicator, see Section 3.2
Oil price 11 Real price of oil, see Section 3.2
Exchange rate 11 Bank of International Settlements (BIS) effective exchange rate index,
broad basket
Note: The vintage of Norwegian data are collected from Statistics Norway (SSB). We use data from the
quarterly national account and the central government fiscal account. In the official statistics, data for
some of the series (e.g. for employment), do not cover the earlier part of our sample, but were generously
made available to us by SSB. The international data, with the exception of the exchange rate, were sourced
from the GVAR database constructed by Gang Zhang, Ambrogio Cesa Bianchi, and Alessandro Rebucci
at the Inter-American Development Bank. In the column head “Empl.”, an “x” indicates that we use
both value added and employment data for the variable at hand. All value added data are measured in real
terms, as calculated by SSB. The following transformation codes applies: 9 = year-on-year percentage
growth (yt = xt/xt−4 × 100 − 100), 11 = year-on-year logarithmic difference (yt = ln(xt) − ln(xt−4)).
See Section 3.2 and the text for additional details.
Table 1 summarizes the data entertained, their sources, and the transformations used.
As described briefly in Section 3.2 of the main paper, we also remove the local mean (of
the transformed data) and then standardize the resulting data before estimation. The
local mean adjustment is done prior to the standardization to control for low frequent
movements in the growth rates (changes in the mean) across time, see, e.g., Stock and
Watson (2012). We have experimented with different methods of doing the local mean
adjustment. In the benchmark case we simply subtract a deterministic linear time trend
from the transformed data. In two alternatives we estimate the local mean as the average
of the transformed data over a centered moving window of +−30 quarters, and as the
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components of the time series with fluctuations between 150 and 200 quarters, obtained
from a band-pass filter. Irrespective of which method we use the resulting time series are
highly similar.25 Finally, some of the series also inhabit clear outliers or measurement
errors (e.g., Transfers). We define outliers as observations being outside 3× interquartile
range, and automatically remove them by using linear interpolation.
Appendix B Additional results
B.1 Business cycle factors
Figure 9. Observable and latent factors
World activity Real price of oil
Resource activity Mainland (domestic) activity
Note: The figures display the two observable factors together with the two estimated latent factors. The
color shadings represent the 70, 50, and 30 percent quantiles of the posterior distribution. The black line
is the median estimate.
25The band-pass and the deterministic linear trend removal approaches result in time series with a corre-
lation coefficients well above 0.95 for most series.
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B.2 Components of public spending
Figure 10. Oil price shock and the fiscal budget: Time-varying responses
S
p
e
n
d
in
g
e
x
cl
.
p
e
n
si
o
n
s
Horizons 1-12 Horizon 1 Horizon 4
1983.01 1990.03 1998.01 2005.03 2012.04
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
1983.01 1990.03 1998.01 2005.03 2012.04
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
T
ra
n
sf
e
r
to
m
u
n
ic
ip
a
li
ti
e
s
1983.01 1990.03 1998.01 2005.03 2012.04
-0.5
0
0.5
1983.01 1990.03 1998.01 2005.03 2012.04
-0.5
0
0.5
O
p
e
ra
ti
o
n
co
st
s
1983.01 1990.03 1998.01 2005.03 2012.04
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1983.01 1990.03 1998.01 2005.03 2012.04
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
Note: The first column displays estimated impulse responses at three different periods of time. The
initial shock is normalized to 1 percent (of the normalized data). All responses are reported in levels
(of the normalized data). The subsequent two columns report a snapshot of the responses across the
whole sample for two specific response horizons. The color shadings represent the 70, 50, and 30 percent
quantiles of the posterior distribution. The black line is the median estimate. The line is solid (dotted)
whenever the median estimate is outside (inside) the 70 percent quantile in 2001:Q1.
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Figure 11. World activity shock and the fiscal budget: Time-varying responses
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Note: See Figure 10.
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B.3 The domestic economy
Figure 12. Oil price shock and the macroeconomy: Time-varying responses
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Note: See Figure 10.
Figure 13. World activity shock and the macroeconomy: Time-varying responses
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Figure 14. Systematic interest rate and inflation responses across time
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Note: The plots report the response, across time (x-axis) and horizons (y-axis), of inflation and the short
term interest rate to two different oil market shocks; world activity and oil price specific shocks. The
initial shocks are normalized to one percent (of the normalized data).
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Appendix C Convergence of the Markov Chain Monte
Carlo Algorithm
Table 2. Convergence statistics
Parameters
Statistic W S B V Q∗t H
∗
t Z
∗
t at
AutoCorr −0.0(−0.1,0.1)
−0.0
(−0.1,0.0)
−0.0
(−0.0,0.1)
0.0
(−0.1,0.1)
0.0
(−0.1,0.1)
0.0
(−0.1,0.1)
0.0
(−0.1,0.1)
0.0
(−0.1,0.1)
RNE 0.9(0.4,1.7)
0.3
(0.3,0.5)
0.7
(0.4,1.0)
0.2
(0.1,0.3)
0.5
(0.2,1.5)
1.0
(0.6,1.8)
0.8
(0.3,2.1)
0.4
(0.1,1.2)
IRL 1.0(1.0,1.1)
1.3
(1.3,1.3)
1.1
(1.1,1.1)
1.5
(1.0,2.1)
1.2
(1.1,1.3)
1.0
(1.0,1.0)
1.0
(0.9,1.6)
1.0
(1.0,1.0)
Note: The AutoCorr row reports the 10th-order sample autocorrelation of the draws, the RNE row reports
the relative numerical efficiency measure, proposed by Geweke (1992), while the IRL row reports the i-
statistic, proposed by Raftery and Lewis (1992). For each entry we report the mean value together with the
minimum and maximum value obtained across all parameters in parentheses. Finally, for computational
convenience, the scores for Q∗t , H
∗
t , and Z
∗
t are only computed for observations 10, 40, 70, and 100.
Table 2 summarizes the main convergence statistics used to check that the Gibbs sampler
mixes well. In the table we first report the mean, as well as the minimum and maximum,
of the 10th-order sample autocorrelation of the posterior draws across all parameters. A
low value indicates that the draws are close to independent. The second row of the table
reports the relative numerical efficiency measure (RNE), proposed by Geweke (1992).
Here we use an RNE version controlling for autocorrelation in the draws by employing
a 4 percent tapering of the spectral window used in the computation of the RNE. The
RNE measure provides an indication of the number of draws that would be required to
produce the same numerical accuracy if the draws represented had been made from an
i.i.d. sample drawn directly from the posterior distribution. An RNE value close to or
below unity is regarded as satisfactory. The last row, labeled IRL, reports the mean of
the i-statistic. This statistic was proposed by Raftery and Lewis (1992). In essence it
measures the ratio of two other statistics: the total number of draws needed to achieve
the desired accuracy for each parameter, and the number of draws that would be needed
if the draws represented an i.i.d. chain, see Raftery and Lewis (1992) for details.26 Values
of IRL exceeding 5 indicate convergence problems with the sampler.
As can be seen from the results reported in Table 2, the sampler seems to have con-
verged. That is, the mean autocorrelations are all very close to zero, and the minimum or
maximum values obtained seldom exceed 0.1 in absolute value. Moreover, the mean RNE
statistic does not exceed unity by a large margin for any of the parameters. However,
for W , Q∗t , H
∗
t , and Z
∗
t there are signs that some of the parameters have higher scores.
For example, for Z∗t , the maximum obtained score is 2.1, indicating that only roughly 20
percent of the numbers of draws would be required to achieve the same accuracy from
an i.i.d. set of draws. Finally, the IRL statistics are always well below 5. Additional
convergence results can be obtained on request.
26The parameters used for computing these diagnostics are as follows: quantile = 0.025; desired accuracy
= 0.025; required probability of attaining the required accuracy = 0.95.
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Appendix D Prior specification and sensitivity
As noted in Section 3, to implement the MCMC algorithm, and estimate the model,
we need priors for the initial state variables a0, z0, ao0, h
σ
0 , and h
η
0, and for the hyper-
parameters Φ, S, B, W , Φ and V . In a high dimensional model such as ours, the prior
specification will never be innocent. Below, we first describe the prior specification used
in the benchmark model, i.e., the model on which the results in Section 4 build. We
proceed then to elaborate the reasons why this specific prior specification was adopted, and
subsequently also discuss the sensitivity of our main results to other prior specifications.
In sum, the priors for the initial states take the following form:
a0 ∼N(
¯
y, Iqh) z0 ∼N(zˆOLS, Im˜)
ao0 ∼N(0, Iqq) hσ0 ∼N(0, Iq)
hη0 ∼N(0, IN)
where m˜ = q(s + 1)N , qq = q(q−1)
2
, and
¯
y is a stacked column vector of the observed
values for the first q variables in yt for t = 0, . . . ,−h. zˆOLS are constant parameter
OLS estimates of the matrix Z (stacked by rows) in equation (1a), covering the sample
1981:Q3-1990:Q1. In these initial estimates the unknown elements of at are approximated
by principal components estimates of the panel of observables in y˜T .
27
The priors for the hyper-parameters Φ and Φ are set to:
¯
Φ ∼N(ΦˆOLS, V (ΦˆOLS))
¯
Φi ∼N(0, Ip · 0.5) for i = 1, . . . , N
where ΦˆOLS are OLS estimates of equation (1b), covering the sample 1982:Q1-2012:Q4.
As above, when estimating the OLS quantities, the unknown elements of at are approx-
imated by principal components estimates of the panel of observables in y˜T . V (ΦˆOLS) is
a diagonal matrix where the non-zero entries are the variance terms associated with the
ΦˆOLS elements.
The priors for the remaining hyper-parameters are all from the Inverse-Wishart dis-
tribution:
¯
Wi ∼IW (
¯
TW ,
¯
TW · Im · κ2W ) ¯T
W = 125, κW = 0.1 for i = 1, . . . , N
¯
Sl ∼IW (
¯
T S,
¯
T S · Il · κ2S) ¯T
S = 25, κS = 0.05 for l = 1, . . . , q − 1
¯
B ∼IW (
¯
TB,
¯
TB · Iq · κ2B) ¯T
B = 100, κB = 0.1
¯
Vi ∼IW (
¯
T V ,
¯
T V · Ip · κ2V ) ¯T
V = 10, κV = 0.1 for i = 1, . . . , N
where the first element in each prior distribution is the degrees of freedom parameter,
and the second the scale parameter. We note that for the Inverse-Wishart distribution
the prior scale matrix has the interpretation of the prior sum of squared residuals.28
27These estimates do not take into account the potential autocorrelation and stochastic volatility associated
with the idiosyncratic errors.
28Therefore, each scale matrix is multiplied by the degrees of freedom parameter. Also, for the Inverse-
Wishart prior to be proper, the degrees of freedom parameter must be larger than the dimension of the
scale matrix. This is the case in all our prior specifications.
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D.1 Prior discussion
In the following we elaborate our reasons for choosing the prior specification described
above. We focus our discussion of alternative specifications of
¯
Tν and κν for ν = {W,S,B, V },
since the prior specifications for the other priors, zˆOLS, ΦˆOLS, and V (ΦˆOLS), seem to be
of minor empirical importance.29
Before going into the details it is worth considering a simplified example. Assume a
parameter αt follows a Random Walk like αt = αt−1 +et ∼ N(0, Q), where Q ∼ IW (
¯
T,
¯
T ·
κ2). Then, for a given
¯
T , but varying the size of κ will result in very different prior beliefs
about the amount of time variation in αt. For example, letting κ = {0.05, 0.1, 0.15},
will roughly result in a 95 percent prior probability of a 100 percent, 200 percent and
300 percent cumulative change in αt, respectively, over a period of 100 observations.
Accordingly, the priors on V , S, B and W , defines our prior belief on the amount of time
variation in the parameters. We will discuss the latter three first, since our results do not
seem to be sensitive to the prior settings for
¯
TV and κV .
The setting of S and B defines our prior beliefs about the amount of time variation
in equations (7b) and (7c), and ultimately the stochastic volatility part of the transition
equation in (1b). The setting of W defines our prior belief about the amount of time
variation in (7a), i.e., the time-varying factor loadings (zt). Unfortunately, there is a
trade-off between these two. For example, for a similarly sized prior belief on
¯
TB,
¯
TS, and
¯
TW , setting κB and κS very low, but κW very high, will force most of the model fit to end
up through the time-varying factor loadings. That is, the estimated latent business cycle
factors in at will be close at the extreme to straight lines. In the reverse case, setting κB
and κS very high and κW very low, will almost remove the time variation in zt.
The unfortunate trade-off faced in setting the priors for κB, κS and κW make their role
important. Fortunately, our research question and earlier literature can guide us in setting
these priors. The time-varying parameters and stochastic volatilities are introduced in
the Dynamic Factor Model to capture important “stylized facts” associated with global
business cycles in general and the Norwegian domestic business cycle in particular. That
is, we want to allow for: 1) A changing dependence structure, where the panel of domestic
variables have a time-varying exposure to the aggregate business cycle factors, due to, e.g.,
changes in systematic fiscal policy, and 2) Great Moderation and Recession effects, where
the volatility in aggregate business cycle variables seems to have fallen and then increased
again over the last decades.
To allow for 1) we set κW = 0.1 and
¯
TW = 125. This prior belief permits the factor
loadings to vary considerably across time. For our purpose, which is to uncover any po-
tential changes in the parameters due to structural changes in the conduct of fiscal policy,
this seems reasonable. Importantly, as described in Appendix E, the sampling algorithm
used to estimate the time path for the structural parameters is essentially a smoothing
algorithm. However, across the time period evaluated in this analysis many fiscal regimes
have been present, see Section 2. Each new regime will plausibly be associated with a
29This finding is common in the literature entertaining time-varying parameter models, and is also found
in, e.g., Primiceri (2005) and Del Negro and Otrok (2008), all of whom estimate models that are related
to ours.
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new set of policy parameters, that should not be smoothed out. Thus, by allowing for a
high degree of variability in the process driving the time evolution of the structural factor
loadings, we ensure these parameters are free to jump in response to new policy regimes.
The downside of imposing this prior belief is, of course, that the factor loadings might
change considerably over time, but just in order to explain outliers and push the in-sample
errors to zero. As noted in Primiceri (2005), this type of behavior by the time-varying
parameters is typical of very narrow likelihood peaks in possibly uninteresting regions of
the parameter space, where the level of the likelihood is not informative of the model’s
fit. However, our focus is not on, e.g., forecasting, where the above problem might be a
bigger concern, but on uncovering jumps in the systematic policy parameters across time
and the associated implications for the Norwegian macro economy.
To allow for 2), we set κS = 0.05 and κB = 0.1. This belief is in accordance with a
large literature that have already established that the volatility of international business
cycle shocks have indeed changed a great deal in recent decades. For example, both Stock
and Watson (2005) and Del Negro and Otrok (2008) document drops in volatility among
G7 countries of over 50 percent since the late 1970s. The findings in Del Negro and Otrok
(2008) suggest moreover that the fall in the volatility in the Norwegian business cycle is
even bigger, close to 150 percent over the period from the early 1980s to the mid 2000s.
And according to findings in Baumeister and Peersman (2013), the conditional standard
deviation in the change in the real price of oil has moved from around 20 in the mid 1980s,
to 10 in the mid 1990s, and back again to above 20 at the late 2000s, reflecting changes
of over 100 percent within a period of 10 years. Our setting of
¯
TB = 100 reflects our
confidence in this evidence. Conversely, our setting of
¯
TS = 25 reflects our lack of strong
prior beliefs about time-variation in aot, at least for the Norwegian economy. Moreover,
as described above, both κS, κB, and their associated degrees of freedom parameters must
be set in relation to κW and
¯
TW . Since we allow for a large degree of variation in the
factor loadings, we must also allow for a large degree of variation in the volatilities. If
not, our experience is that most of the model fit is tilted toward variation in one of them,
which is not a desirable property.30
We have neither good evidence nor prior belief as to the amount of time variation to
expect in the stochastic volatilities associated with the idiosyncratic errors. Therefore,
κV is set equal to κB for consistency, and
¯
TV = 10, reflecting that we are reasonably
uninformative about this parameter.
Finally, it should be remembered that the posterior estimates will be a weighted
average of our prior beliefs and the information contained in the data (the likelihood
function). As the sample size grows, the posterior mean converges to the maximum
likelihood estimate.
30As a check of whether or not these priors are sensible we have also estimated a Dynamic Factor Model with
no time-varying parameters over two different sub-samples: 1982:Q1-1995:Q4 and 1996:Q1-2012:Q4. By
computing the absolute change in the factor loadings and the standard deviation of the errors in equation
(1b) across those two sub-samples we find that the absolute change in z is well above 100 percent, for
many variables, and that the absolute change in Σ is in fact close to 150 percent for the Norwegian
business cycle factors. Thus, although somewhat on the high end, our prior belief on the amount of time
variation in zt (reflected by the W prior) and Σt (reflected by the B prior) seem reasonable also according
to this criteria.
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D.2 Prior sensitivity
To gauge the extent to which our results are sensitive to alternative prior beliefs, we ran
the model using a set of alternatives. In the light of our discussion in Section D.1, we
focus on the priors for B and W , and the setting of κ. Especially, we estimate the model
letting κ be in the set κ = {0.05, 0.1, 0.15} for all combinations of B(κ) and W (κ). In
total this amounts to 9 different model estimates, encompassing our benchmark model but
also allowing for models which a-priori allow for somewhat lower and higher parameter
variability. We evaluate the appropriateness of these models both informally and formally.
In a Bayesian setting, the natural formal scoring metric is the marginal likelihood.
However, for high dimensional and complex time-varying factor models such as ours, com-
puting this statistic is difficult, and we are not aware of any good agreed upon method for
how to do so. For this reason we developed a Reversible Jump Markov Chain Monte Carlo
(RJMCMC) algorithm to assess the marginal likelihood implied by the different model
and prior specifications. A full description of how our implementation of the RJMCMC
algorithm is provided in Appendix F. Here we note that we in a simulation experiment
have validated that the algorithm seems to be able to select the correct model among a
set of competing specifications, but that the convergence properties of the algorithm are
poor and that the estimates have a large degree of uncertainty.31 Still, conditional on
these shortcomings, the marginal likelihood assessment seems to favor models with prior
specifications that imply that κ = 0.05 for the W prior and κ ≥ 0.05 for the B prior, or in
other words, a somewhat lower variability in the factor loadings than what we believe to
be true in the benchmark model, but more or less the same variability for the time-varying
volatilities. Given the attendant caveats as explained above, however, we do not put too
much confidence in these results.
More important, then, is the informal evaluation in which we assess the extent to
which our main results change depending on the prior specification. As explained in
Section D.1, we want to allow for substantial time variation in the factor loadings and the
volatilities, but not enforce it such that the results are solely driven by our prior beliefs.
As documented in Sections 4.1 and 4, when allowing for a large degree of time variation in
both the volatilities and factor loadings, i.e., setting κW and κB high, the results point to
a large degree of time-varying impulse responses. However, the main conclusion regarding
increased procyclical fiscal policy after the implementation of the fiscal rule holds also for
models with priors that allow for much less time variation. Indeed, even for combinations
of B(κ) and W (κ) where κ = 0.05, we observe time variation in the result implying a
more procyclical fiscal policy after the adoption of the fiscal rule. These additional results
are summarized in Figure 15. The figure reports the same type of results as reported
in Figure 6, but for different prior specifications.32 As is clearly seen in the figure, after
a positive world activity shock, fiscal policy has become less countercyclical over time.
31This might be because the likelihood surface is highly complex, or because our implementation of the
algorithm is inefficient. Another reason might be that we have to be parsimonious regarding the number
of simulations due to computational issues, see the discussion in Appendix F.1.
32To make the results across different prior specifications presentable in one figure, we report average
impulse responses across horizons 1-8 for each time period. Additional results for each prior specification
and all impulse response horizons can be obtained on request.
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Figure 15. Public sector relative to the mainland economy using different priors
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Note: Each plot reports the response, across time (x-axis) and prior specification (y-axis), of an outcome
variable in the public sector relative to the response in the mainland economy. Here, the mainland
economy is defined as the average response across all sectors, except the public sector. The initial shock
is normalized to 1 percent (of the normalized data). All the relative responses are reported as averages
across impulse response horizons 1 to 8. A value above zero indicates that the public sector responds more
positively to the given shock than the mainland economy as a whole. The different prior specifications
listed on the y-axis correspond to different combinations of κ for the B and W priors. In particular, we
compare models letting κ be in the set κ = {0.05, 0.1, 0.15} for all combinations of B(κ) and W (κ). Thus,
B1W1 corresponds to setting κ = 0.05 for both B and W , B1W2 corresponds to setting κ = 0.05 for B
and κ = 0.1 for W , etc. The main results reported in Sections 4.1 and 4 correspond to using a model
with the B2W2 prior specification.
After a positive oil price shock, the public sector grows relative to the mainland economy,
and particularly so after the adoption of the fiscal rule. Both findings confirm what have
already documented in Section 4.
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In sum, the sensitivity analysis shows that our main results are not driven by the prior
specification. We leave it to future research to devise better ways of formally computing
posterior model probabilities, or marginal likelihoods, for high dimensional and complex
models as the one entertained here.
Appendix E The Gibbs sampling approach
Section 3.4 of the main paper gives a short overview of how the DFM is estimated. Here we
provide a more detailed overview. For convenience, we repeat the main system equations:
yt =z0,tat + · · ·+ zs,tat−s + et (15a)
at =Φ1at−1 + · · ·+ Φhat−h + A0−1t Σtt (15b)
et =Φ1et−1 + · · ·+ Φpet−p + Υtut (15c)
where (15a) is the observation equation, (15b) the transition equation, and finally, (15c)
the equation describing the law of motion for the idiosyncratic errors. Moreover, the
time-varying parameters and covariances of the model follow random walk processes:
zt =zt−1 + wt ∼ N(0,W ) (16a)
aot =aot−1 + st ∼ N(0, S) (16b)
hσt =h
σ
t−1 + bt ∼ N(0, B) (16c)
hηt =h
η
t−1 + vt ∼ N(0, V ) (16d)
where Zt = [z0,t, . . . , zs,t] and zt = vec(Z
′
t) (the matrix Zt stacked by rows). aot is
the vector on non-zero and non-one elements of the matrix A0t (stacked by rows), and
hσt = log(σt) and h
η
t = log(ηt), see equations (2), (3), (5) and (6). Thus, the model’s
hyper-parameters are defined by Φ, Φ, W , S, B, and V , while the model’s unknown state
variables are defined by at, et, zt, aot, h
σ
t , and h
η
t .
This system is then estimated using Gibbs simulations, which draw the conditional
posterior utilizing 7 blocks. Blocks 1 to 4 draws the states and hyper-parameters associ-
ated with equations (15b), (16b) and (16c). Block 5 draws the state and hyper-parameter
associated with equation (16a), and Blocks 6 and 7 draw the state and hyper-parameters
associated with equations (15c) and (16d). Below we describe each block in greater
detail. For future reference and notational simplicity it will prove useful to define the
following: y˜T = [y1, . . . , yT ]
′, a˜T = [a1, . . . , aT ]′, z˜T = [z1, . . . , zT ]′, e˜T = [e1, . . . , eT ]′,
a˜oT = [ao1, . . . , aoT ]
′, h˜σT = [h
σ
1 , . . . , h
σ
T ]
′, h˜ηT = [h
η
1, . . . , h
η
T ]
′, Φ = [Φ1, . . . , Φh], and
Φ = [Φ1, . . . ,Φp].
E.1 Block 1: a˜T |y˜T , z˜T , e˜T , h˜ηT , a˜oT , h˜σT ,Φ, Φ
Equations (15a) and (15b) constitute a state space system we can use to draw the un-
observed state at using the Carter and Kohn’s multimove Gibbs sampling approach, see
Section E.8. However, to do so we need to make the errors in the observation equation
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conditionally i.i.d. This is easy, given knowledge of equation (15c) and Φ, we can define
Φ(L) = (I−∑pk=1 ΦkLk) and pre-multiply equation (15a) by Φ(L) to obtain the system:
y∗t =z
∗
0,tat + · · ·+ z∗s,tat−s + Υtut Υtut ∼ N(0, Ht) (17a)
at =Φ1at−1 + · · ·+ Φhat−h + A0−1t Σtt A0−1t Σtt ∼ N(0,Ωt) (17b)
where y∗t = (I −
∑p
k=1 ΦkL
k)yt and z
∗
j,t = (I −
∑p
k=1 ΦkL
k)zj,t for j = 0, . . . , s.
Since all hyper-parameters and state variables, less a˜T , are known (or conditionally
known), it follows from equations (2), (3), (5) and (6) that Ωt and Ht are also known
for all t. Accordingly, we can use the equations in (17) together with Carter and Kohn’s
multimove Gibbs sampling approach, to sample at from:
aT | · · · ∼ N(aT |T , P aT |T ), t = T (18a)
at| · · · ∼ N(at|t,at+1 , P at|t,at+1), t = T − 1, T − 2, · · · , 1 (18b)
to get a˜T .
E.2 Block 2: Φ|a˜T , a˜oT , h˜σT
Conditional on a˜T , the transition equation in (15b) is independent of the rest of the model.
As above, conditional on knowing a˜oT and h˜
σ
T , also makes Ωt known. Accordingly, we can
draw Φ based on a conditional posterior that accounts for the heteroscedasticity in the
error terms in (15b). This can be achieved by putting the transition equation on SUR
form.33 To do so, we define:
Yt =

a1,t
a2,t
...
aq,t
 Xt =

xt,1 0 · · · 0
0 xt,2
. . . 0
...
. . . . . .
...
0 · · · 0 xt,q
 εt =

ωA1,t
ωA2,t
...
ωAq,t
 βΦ =

βΦ1
βΦ2
...
βΦq
 (19)
where βΦl = [Φl,1, . . . , Φl,h]
′ and xt,l = [Y ′t−1, . . . , Y
′
t−h] for l = 1, . . . , q, i.e., the autoregres-
sive coefficients from the lth equation in the transition equation and the lagged dependant
variables, and ωAt = A0
−1
t Σtt.
Stacking Yt, Xt and εt together across time lets us write the transition equation as:
Y = XβΦ + ε ∼ N(0,Ψ) (20)
where Y = [Y ′1 , . . . , Y
′
T ]
′, X = [X1, . . . , XT ]′, ε = [ε′1, . . . , εT ]
′, and Ψ is a (T × q)× (T × q)
block diagonal matrix given by:
Ψ =

Ω1 0 · · · 0
0 Ω2
. . . 0
...
. . . . . .
...
0 · · · 0 ΩT
 (21)
33With the transition equation specified in SUR form it becomes easy to adjust the VAR(h) model such
that different regressors enter the q equations of the VAR(h).
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The conditional posterior draws of βΦ, and thus Φ, are:
βΦ| · · · ∼ N(βΦ, V βΦ)I[s(βΦ)] (22)
where I[s(βvarphi)] is an indicator function used to denote that the roots of β lie outside
the unit circle, and:
V βΦ = (V
−1
βΦ
+X ′Ψ−1X)−1 (23a)
β
Φ
= V βΦ(V
−1
βΦ
βΦ +X ′Ψ−1Y ) (23b)
E.3 Block 3: a˜oT |a˜T , h˜σT , Φ, S and S|a˜oT
Conditional on a˜T and Φ we can define aˆt = at − (Φ1at−1 + . . . + Φhat−h), and write
equation (15b) as:
A0taˆt = Σtt (24)
Since A0t is a lower triangular matrix with ones on the diagonal, equation (24) together
with equation (16b) can be written as the state space system:
aˆt =Z˜taot + Σtt Σtt ∼ N(0,Σ′tΣt) (25a)
aot =aot−1 + st st ∼ N(0, S) (25b)
where Z˜t is the following q × q(q−1)2 matrix:
Z˜t =

0 · · · · · · 0
−aˆ1,t 0 · · · 0
0 −aˆ[1,2],t . . . 0
...
. . . . . .
...
0 · · · 0 −aˆ[1,...,q−1],t
 (26)
where aˆ[1,...,j],t denotes the row vector [aˆ1,t, aˆ2,t, . . . , aˆj,t].
Now, although the equations in (25) have a (conditional) Gaussian state space rep-
resentation, the system is nonlinear since aˆt essentially shows up on both sides of the
equality sign in equation (25). Still, under the assumption that the S matrix is block
diagonal, see equation (9), we can apply Carter and Kohn’s multimove Gibbs sampling
approach, see Section E.8, and draw a˜oT in a recursive manner that is consistent with the
assumptions on A0t. That is:
aoT | · · · ∼ N(aoT |T , P aoT |T ), t = T (27a)
aot| · · · ∼ N(aot|t,aot+1 , P aot|t,aot+1), t = T − 1, T − 2, · · · , 1 (27b)
Once a˜oT has been drawn in this manner, the innovations in (16b) are observable, and
we can compute the residual sums of squares. Thus, the conditional posterior of Sl for
l = 1, . . . , q − 1 can be sampled from the Inverse-Wishart distribution:
Sl| · · · ∼ IW (v¯S, S¯l) (28)
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where v¯S = T+TS, S¯l = [Sl+
∑T
t=1 ξ
S′
l,tξ
S
l,t], and ξ
S
l,t = aol,t−aol,t−1 are the errors associated
with the lth block.34
E.4 Block 4: h˜σT |a˜T , a˜oT , Φ,B and B|h˜σT
Conditional on a˜oT , Φ and a˜T , the L.H.S of equation (24) is known, and can be written
as:
aˆ∗t = Σtt (29)
where aˆ∗t = A0taˆt is an observable.
Together with the transition equation in (16c), the observation equation in (29) con-
stitutes a nonlinear state space system. The nonlinearity can be converted into a linear
one by squaring and taking logarithms of every element of (29), yielding:
aˆ∗∗t =2h
σ
t + d
σ
t (30a)
hσt =h
σ
t−1 + bt (30b)
where dσl,t = log(
2
l,t), h
σ
l,t = log(σl,t), aˆ
∗∗
l,t = log[(aˆ
∗
l,t)
2 + c¯] for l = 1, . . . , q. c¯ = 0.001 is an
offsetting constant added to the latter expression to avoid potentially taking the log of
zero.
Now the system in (30) is linear, but it has a non-Gaussian state space form, because
the innovations in the observation equation are distributed as log χ2(1). In order to
further transform the system into a Gaussian one, a mixture of normals approximation of
the log χ2(1) distribution is used. Following Kim et al. (1998), we select a mixture of seven
normal densities with component probabilities qγ, mean mγ−1.2704, and variances v2γ, for
γ = 1, . . . , 7. The constants qγ,mγ, v
2
γ are chosen to match a number of moments of the
log χ2(1) distribution. Since the covariance matrix of  is an identity matrix, this implies
that the covariance matrix of dσ is also a diagonal, and we can use the same (independent)
mixture of normals approximation for any element of dσ. Accordingly, conditionally on
aˆ∗∗j,t and ht, we can sample a selection matrix s˜T = [s1, . . . , sT ]
′ as:
Pr(sl,t = γ|aˆ∗∗l,t, hσl,t) ∝ qγfN(aˆ∗∗l,t|2hσl,t +mγ − 1.2704, v2γ) γ = 1, . . . , 7 l = 1, . . . , q (31)
and use this to select which member of the mixture of the normal approximations that
should be used to construct the covariance matrix of dσ and adjust the mean of aˆ∗∗t at
every point in time.
Denoting the adjusted observations and covariances as aˆ∗∗∗t = aˆ
∗∗
t −mγ=st +1.2704 and
Dσt , respectively, the system in (30) finally has an approximate linear and Gaussian state
space form. Again, like above, this allows one to recursively recover hσt for t = 1, . . . , T
using the Carter and Kohn algorithm:
hσT | · · · ∼ N(hσT |T , P h
σ
T |T ), t = T (32a)
hσt | · · · ∼ N(hσt|t,hσt+1 , P
hσ
t|t,hσt+1), t = T − 1, T − 2, · · · , 1 (32b)
34Remember that the l = 1 elements of ξSl,t and Sl are associated with the l + 1 row of A0t. Accordingly,
for l = 1, S1 will be a 1× 1 matrix, for l = 2, S2 will be a 2× 2 matrix, etc. See also Section 3.1.
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Likewise, conditional on h˜σT , the posterior of B is drawn from the Inverse-Wishart
distribution:
B| · · · ∼ IW (v¯B, B¯) (33)
where v¯B = T + TB, B¯ = [B +
∑T
t=1 ξ
B′
t ξ
B
t ], and ξ
B
t = h
σ
t − hσt−1.
E.5 Block 5: z˜T |y˜T , a˜T , e˜T , h˜ηT ,Φ,W and W |z˜T
Conditionally on a˜T the errors in (15a) are independent across i. Moreover, we have as-
sumed that the covariance matrix of zt in equation (16a) is block diagonal. Consequently,
we can draw z˜T one equation at a time. As in Appendix E.1 we deal with the fact that the
errors in the observation equation are not conditionally i.i.d. by applying the quasi differ-
encing operator, Φ(L) = (I −∑pk=1 ΦkLk), to each equation. Thus, for each i = 1, . . . , N ,
we define zˆj,t as the ith row of zj,t and wˆj,t as the errors in (16a) associated with zˆj,t (for
j = 0, . . . , s), and obtain the following Gaussian state space system:
y∗i,t =a
∗
t zˆ0,t + · · ·+ a∗t−szˆs,t + ηi,tui,t ηi,tui,t ∼ N(0, η′i,tηi,t) (34a)
zˆt =Ξzˆt−1 + wˆt wˆt ∼ N(0,Wi) (34b)
where a∗t = [(I −
∑p
k=1 ΦkL
k)at]
′, zˆt = [zˆ0,t, . . . , zˆs,t]′, wˆt = [wˆ0,t, . . . , wˆs,t]′ and Ξ is a
(s + 1) × (s + 1) identity matrix. Since Wi and η′i,tηi,t are conditionally known for each
i, the Carter and Kohn algorithm is implemented on (34), in the same manner as before,
to sample:
zˆT | · · · ∼ N(zˆT |T , P zˆT |T ), t = T (35a)
zˆt| · · · ∼ N(zˆt|t,ht+1 , P zˆt|t,zˆt+1), t = T − 1, T − 2, · · · , 1 (35b)
Conditionally on ˜ˆzT , we sample Wi from the Inverse-Wishart distribution:
Wi| · · · ∼ IW (v¯W , W¯i) (36)
where v¯W = T + TW , W¯i = [Wi +
∑T
t=1 ξ
W ′
i,t ξ
W
i,t ], and ξ
W
i,t = zˆt − zˆt−1.
Repeating this algorithm for i = 1 . . . , N , gives us z˜T and W .
E.6 Block 6: e˜T |y˜T , a˜T , z˜T and Φ|e˜T , h˜ηT
For each observation we have that:
et = yt − z0,tat + · · ·+ zs,tat−s (37)
Thus, conditional on y˜T , a˜T and z˜T , e˜T is observable.
As above, since e˜T is independent across i, we can sample Φ in (15c) one equation at
the time. Conditional on hηT , this is done in the same manner as in Appendix E.2, with the
difference that now the definitions in (19) are replaced by: Yt = [e1,t, . . . , eN,t]
′, and εt =
[ωE1,t, . . . , ω
E
N,t]
′, with ωEt = Υtut. Further, β
Φ = [βΦ1 , . . . , β
Φ
N ]
′ with βΦi = [Φi,1, . . . ,Φi,p]
′,
and
Ψ =

H1 0 · · · 0
0 H2
. . . 0
...
. . . . . .
...
0 · · · 0 HT
 (38)
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The conditional posterior draws of βΦ, and thus Φ, are therefore:
βΦ| · · · ∼ N(βΦ, V βΦ)I[s(βΦ)] (39)
where I[s(βΦ)] is an indicator function used to denote that the roots of β lie outside the
unit circle, and:
V βΦ =(V
−1
βΦ
+X ′Ψ−1X)−1 (40a)
β
Φ
=V βΦ(V
−1
βΦ
βΦ +X ′Ψ−1Y ) (40b)
E.7 Block 7: h˜ηT |e˜T ,Φ, V and V |h˜ηT
Conditionally on having sampled e˜T and Φ, we can continue to sample h˜
η
T for each equation
independently. This is done as in Appendix E.4.
For concreteness, we define, for i = 1, . . . , N :
eˆ∗i,t = ηi,tui,t (41)
where eˆ∗i,t = [ei,t − Φi,1ei,t−1 + · · · + Φi,pei,t−p] is now an observable. Squaring and tak-
ing logarithms on each element in (41) and using the law of motion for the stochastic
volatilities in (16d), we get the following non-Gaussian state space system:
eˆ∗∗i,t =2h
η
i,t + d
η
i,t (42a)
hηi,t =h
η
i,t−1 + vi,t (42b)
where dηi,t = log(u
2
i,t), h
η
i,t = log(ηi,t), eˆ
∗∗
i,t = log[(eˆ
∗
i,t)
2 + c¯], and c¯ = 0.001.
The state space system in (42) is linear but non-Gaussian, and simulation of:
hηT | · · · ∼ N(hηT |T , P h
η
T |T ), t = T (43a)
hηt | · · · ∼ N(hηt|t,hηt+1 , P
hη
t|t,hηt+1), t = T − 1, T − 2, · · · , 1 (43b)
is conducted as described in Appendix E.4.
Finally, conditionally on h˜ηT , we sample Vi, for i = 1, . . . , N , from the Inverse-Wishart
distribution:
Vi| · · · ∼ IW (v¯V , V¯i) (44)
where v¯V = T+TV , V¯i = [Vi+
∑T
t=1 ξ
V ′
i,t ξ
V
i,t], and ξ
V
i,t = h
η
i,t−hηi,t−1 are the errors associated
with the ith equation.
E.8 The Carter and Kohn algorithm
Consider a generic state space system, written in companion form, and described by:
yt =Ztat + et ∼ N(0, Ht) (45a)
at =Γat−1 +Gut ∼ N(0,Ωt) (45b)
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where we assume Zt, Γ , G, Ht and Ωt are known, and we wish to estimate the latent
state at for all t = 1, . . . , T . To do so, we can apply Carter and Kohn’s multimove Gibbs
sampling approach (see Carter and Kohn (1994)).
First, because the state space model given in equation (45) is linear and (conditionally)
Gaussian, the distribution of at given y˜T and that of at given at+1 and y˜t for t = T−1, · · · , 1
are also Gaussian:
aT |y˜T ∼ N(aT |T , PT |T ), t = T (46a)
at|y˜t, at+1 ∼ N(at|t,at+1 , Pt|t,at+1), t = T − 1, T − 2, · · · , 1 (46b)
where
aT |T = E(aT |y˜T ) (47a)
PT |T = Cov(aT |y˜T ) (47b)
at|t,at+1 = E(at|y˜t, at+1) = E(at|at|t, at|t+1) (47c)
Pt|t,at+1 = Cov(at|y˜t, at+1) = Cov(at|at|t, at|t+1) (47d)
Given a0|0 and P0|0, the unknown states aT |T and PT |T needed to draw from (46a) can
be estimated from the (conditionally) Gaussian Kalman Filter as:
at|t−1 = Γat−1|t−1 (48a)
Pt|t−1 = ΓPt−1|t−1Γ ′ +GΩtG′ (48b)
Kt = Pt|t−1Z ′t(ZtPt|t−1Z
′
t +Ht)
−1 (48c)
at|t = at|t−1 +Kt(yt − Ztat|t−1) (48d)
Pt|t = Pt|t−1 −KtZtPt|t−1 (48e)
That is, at t = T , equation 48d and 48e above, together with equation 46a, can be used
to draw aT |T . Moreover, at|t,at+1 for t = T − 1, T − 2, · · · , 1 can also be simulated based
on 46b, where at|t,at+1 and Pt|t,at+1 are generated from the following updating equations:
at|t,at+1 = at|t + Pt|tΓ
′(ΓPt|tΓ ′ +GΩtG′)−1(at+1 − Γat|t) (49a)
Pt|t,at+1 = Pt|t + Pt|tΓ
′(ΓPt|tΓ ′ +GΩtG′)−1ΓPt|t (49b)
Appendix F Marginal Likelihood computation and
the Reversible Jump Markov Chain Monte
Carlo (RJMCMC) algorithm
The RJMCMC was first proposed by Green (1995), and has since been applied, and
modified, in a number of different settings, including model selection. Dellaportas et al.
(2002) and Lopes and West (2004) provide two, of many extant, examples. The algorithm
derived here extends that presented in Primiceri (2005) to a dynamic factor model setting,
accounting for time-varying parameters.
Following the notation in Primiceri (2005) we consider a set of M competing models.
In our setting these models differ in the prior assumptions, see Section D.2. Essentially, the
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RJMCMC algorithm is nothing more than a Metropolis-Hastings (MH) sampler, where
the goal is to sample the joint posterior distribution of model m ∈M and the associated
model parameters, here denoted θm. This is done by generating a proposal value of
(m′, θm
′
) from a proposal distribution qp(m
′, θm
′
) = q(θm
′|m′) · J(m′). The new proposal
is accepted using a MH acceptance probability. If the proposal is rejected, it is replaced by
the previous element of the chain. After a sufficient number of draws, an approximation to
the posterior of (m′, θm
′
) can be computed, as can posterior probabilities over the models’
space.
More specifically, the sampler used is an independence chain Metropolis Hastings
algorithm, and we proceed as follows:
1. For every m ∈ M we approximate the posterior based on the Gibbs sampler al-
gorithm explained in Section E. These approximate posteriors are then used as
proposal distributions for the elements in θm:
q(Φm|m) =N(Φm, var(Φm) · 1)
q(Φm|m) =N(Φm, var(Φm) · 1)
q(Wm|m) =IW (125,Wm · 125)
q(Sm|m) =IW (25, Sm · 25)
q(Bm|m) =IW (100, Bm · 100)
q(V m|m) =IW (10, V m · 10)
The variables denoted with an upper bar are the posterior means and variances from
the initial Gibbs sampler. The variances are made more diffuse than the exact ones
to facilitate the convergence of the MH algorithm.35
2. Initialize m and draw θm from the proposal distribution q(θm|m).
3. Draw m′ from an unconditional proposal distribution J(m′) over the models (here
we use the uniform distribution), and draw θm
′
from the conditional proposal dis-
tribution q(θm
′|m′), such that qp(m′, θm′) = q(θm′ |m′) · J(m′).
4. Accept the new couple (m′, θm
′
) with probability:
α(m,m′) = min
{
1, p(yT |m
′,θm
′
)p(θm
′ |m′)p(m′)qp(m,θm)
p(yT |m,θm)p(θm|m)p(m)qp(m′,θm′ )
}
where p(yT |m, θm) is the likelihood of the model, computed using a particle filter,
see Appendix F.1. p(θm|m) being the prior of θm within model m, with p(m) being
the prior model probability. We employ equal prior probabilities, so these terms
cancel out. If the new draw is not accepted, keep the previous couple (m, θm).
5. Go to 3.
35However, as noted in Section D.2, the convergence properties of the proposed algorithm are not good.
Although we have not been able to do this, it could probably be improved upon by a better specification
of the proposal distributions. See also the discussion at the end of Appendix F.1.
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The MH sampler is run using a handful of independent chains. The approximate
posteriors, constructed in step 1, are based on 8000 iterations of the Gibbs sampler for
eachm ∈M . The first 4000 iterations are discarded and only every fourth of the remaining
iterations is used for inference.
F.1 The particle filter and likelihood computation
In step 4 of the reversible jump algorithm described above we need to calculate the
likelihood of the proposed model; p(yT |m, θm). For traditional (conditional) Gaussian
state space models the likelihood can easily be computed through the Kalman filter,
which integrates out the dependence of the stochastic latent factors. However, computing
the likelihood of the state space model described by the equations in (15) and (16) is more
complicated since the parameters are stochastic and the expressions involve products of
stochastic variables. To evaluate the likelihood we therefore employ a Rao-Blackwellized
particle filter. This particle filter is particularly suitable for state space systems, like ours,
where part of the problem can be solved analytically, see Creal (2009) for a short overview
and further references. Below we provide a brief description of the algorithm.
Consider a non-linear state space system with hyper-parameters θ, state variable x
(in our model the state variable x contains both the time-varying factor loadings, the
stochastic volatilities, and the factors), and observable data given by yt . Then, the goal
is to estimate the joint smoothing distribution of the latent state, given by:
p(x0:t|y1:t; θ) = p(y1:t, x0:t; θ)
p(y1:t; θ)
=
p(yt|xt; θ)p(xt|xt−1; θ)
p(yt|y1:t−1; θ) p(x0:t−1|y1:t−1; θ) (51)
However, solving (51) analytically is difficult due to the assumed non-linearity of the
system. This motivates the use of Sequential Monte Carlo methods, such as the particle
filter. Instead of solving (51) directly, these methods utilize the recursive structure of
the joint smoothing distribution, as highlighted by the last equality sign in (51), and two
of it’s marginal distributions, namely the predictive distribution p(xt|y1:t−1; θ) and the
filtering distribution given by:
p(xt|y1:t; θ) = p(yt, xt|y1:t−1; θ)
p(yt|y1:t−1; θ) =
p(yt|xt; θ)p(xt|y1:t−1; θ)
p(yt|y1:t−1; θ) (52)
Here, p(yt, xt|y1:t−1; θ) = p(yt|xt; θ)p(xt|y1:t−1; θ) is the joint distribution of the data and
the state variables, and p(yt|yt−1; θ) is the contribution to the likelihood function (or the
normalizing constant). Accordingly, to sequentially solve 51, starting from an initial draw
of the state, the last period’s filtering distribution is projected forward using the predictive
distribution and then updated using the filtering distribution. These iterations continue
until the end of the sample.
Difficulty arises because the predictive distribution (p(xt|y1:t−1; θ)) and the contribu-
tion to the likelihood (p(yt|yt−1; θ)) involves integrals that typically cannot be calculated
analytically. To see this, we can re-write the two terms as:
p(yt|y1:t−1; θ) =
∫
p(yt|xt; θ)p(xt|y1:t−1; θ)dxt (53)
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and
p(xt|y1:t−1; θ) =
∫
p(xt|xt−1; θ)p(xt−1|y1:t−1; θ)dxt−1 (54)
Still, these integrals can be approximated using Monte Carlo integration. Draw N particles
from p(x0|y0; θ) and use (54) to calculate the predicted value of the state. Then update
the value of the state variables based on the information in the data using (52). The
latter step is conducted as an importance sampling step, where the particle draws are
re-weighted. By conducting these prediction and updating steps for t = 1, . . . , T , the
joint smoothing distribution in (51) can be obtained. Importantly for our purpose, the
contribution to the likelihood at each time period, equation (53), can in most cases be
obtained directly from the estimated importance weights.
Partly due to the importance sampling step, which creates options regarding impor-
tance distribution, many different particle filters have been proposed. In our model, part of
the joint smoothing distribution can be solved analytically, and we take advantage of this
fact when designing the filter by decomposing the state xt into two blocks; xt = (x
′
1,t, a
′
t)
′.
That is, we group the time-varying factor loadings and the stochastic volatilities into x1,t
while the factors are grouped into at. In short, we have the state space system:
yt =Zt(xt)at + et ∼ N(0, Ht(xt)) (55a)
at =Γat−1 +Gut ∼ N(0,Ωt(xt)) (55b)
The marginal filtering distribution can then be decomposed as:
p(x1,t, at|y1:t; θ) = p(at|x1,t, y1:t; θ)p(x1,t|y1:t; θ)
Particles are only simulated randomly from p(x1,t|y1:t; θ) while conditional on each draw of
xi1,t, the distribution of p(at|xi1,t, y1:t; θ) can be evaluated analytically. In sum, we proceed
as follows:
1. At t = 0 and for i = 1, . . . , N , draw x1,0 and a0 from some unconditional distribu-
tions and set wi0 =
1
N
2. Set t = t+1. For i = 1, . . . , N , run the prediction step of the Kalman filter to obtain
the conditional likelihood (using the prediction error decomposition), and calculate
the importance weights as wˆit =
wit∑N
j=1 w
j
t
, where wit is the conditional likelihood
associated with particle i.
3. By the law of large numbers, the contribution to the likelihood can be approximated
as log(p(yt|yt−1; θ)) = log(
∑N
i=1 w
i
t
N
)
4. Re-sample the N particles {xi1,t−1|t−1, ait−1|t−1}Ni=1 with probabilities {wˆit}Ni=1, and set
wit =
1
N
5. For i = 1, . . . , N , draw x1,t conditional on x1,t−1 and run the Kalman filter on each
particle to obtain at|t.
6. Return to 2.
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We confirmed in a simulation experiment the ability of the particle filter approach
described above to estimate the latent state variables (the time-varying factor loadings,
the stochastic volatilities, and the factors) with a high degree of precision. That said, in
systems with a high number of states, as is the case here, a substantial number of particles
needs to be entertained to obtain reliable estimates of the joint smoothing distribution.
This, however, makes the use of the particle filter within the RJMCMC algorithm de-
scribed above infeasible. The computation time is simply too large. However, it is our
experience that a substantially lower number of particles is needed to obtain reasonably
stable estimates of the contribution to the likelihood function. We take advantage of this
when we employ the particle filter within the RJMCMC sampler, but emphasize that this
downscaling of the number of particles likely contributes to increased sampling variation
and thus worse convergence properties of the algorithm as a whole, cf. the discussion in
Section D.2.
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